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 A. INTRODUCTION
Under many legal systems, several causes of  action may arise from one and the 
same set of  facts. This article focuses on situations where, between two parties,1 
a single incident (allegedly) gives rise to a contractual and a tortious cause 
of  action.2 Under many laws such claims are cumulative in nature and the 
claimant may pursue one or the other, or both, in order to recoup his losses. 
Examples may be the liability of  a doctor in relation to a patient for negli-
gent medical treatment, product liability of  a manufacturer against his buyer, 
or liability under a contract of  carriage for personal injury or cargo damage.
In such cases, diffi cult questions of  private international law arise. This 
article is confi ned to jurisdictional and jurisdiction-related issues under the Judg-
ments Regulation;3 choice-of-law problems 4 as well as national jurisdictional law 
will not be considered. However, as far as the Regulation leaves questions to 
national law, English law will be considered primarily. The focus will lie on 
elaborating the applicable legal principles de lege lata (under the current ver-
sion of  the Regulation), rather than on developing new proposals de lege ferenda.
In this context, several questions arise. Firstly, concerning jurisdiction, it 
ought to be examined if  and to what extent the claimant may, apart from Arti-
cle 2, bring his claims under Article 5(1) and/or 5(3)5 and particularly whether 
and to what extent he has a free choice as to how to frame his claim for these 
purposes. This involves analysing whether these provisions are mutually exclu-
* MLaw (University of  Zurich), LLM (King’s College London); Research Associate, University of  
Zurich.
1 Multi-party situations are not considered; however, similar problems may arise in cases of  joint 
liability for one and the same damage.
2 Other areas of  law potentially giving rise to cumulative causes of  action are not considered.
3 Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of  22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of  judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1 (Judgments Reg-
ulation).
4 See J Fawcett, J Harris and M Bridge, International Sale of  Goods in the Confl ict of  Laws (Oxford 
University Press, 2005), ch 20.
5 Regarding Art 5, it will be supposed that the defendant is domiciled in another Member State.
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sive. Even if  they are, however, it would not automatically follow that they 
cannot simultaneously apply; this clearly emerges from the Kalfelis case. 6
Secondly, if  the claimant may, indeed, pursue his claims in different fora, 
questions of  parallel litigation (Articles 27, 28) must be examined – in particu-
lar, whether in such cases the contractual proceedings involve the same cause 
of  action as the tortious proceedings. On the other hand, delicate questions 
of  res judicata will arise,7 namely whether judgment on one claim precludes the 
other and, if  not, how double satisfaction can be prevented.
B. CONCURRENT LIABILITY: JURISDICTION 
UNDER ARTICLE 5(1) AND 5(3)
If  the claimant alleges to have, according to the (allegedly) applicable law, 
cumulatively a claim in contract and in tort, both providing for compensation 
of  the same damage out of  the same incident, the question arises whether 
he can pursue these claims under Article 5(1) and/or 5(3) and whether this 
is subject to his free choice. At the jurisdictional stage, the applicable law is 
yet to be determined and it is unknown whether the substantive law (or even 
the choice-of-law rules) will allow cumulative pursuance and obtaining multi-
ple judgments (cumulative remedies), require election of  either cause of  action 
(alternative remedies) ,8 or will provide for the French principle of  non-cumul 
(one remedy being subsidiary).9 However, relying on the hypothetically appli-
cable law is unfavourable and inconsistent with the independent interpretation 
of  matters relating to contract/tort by the European Court of  Justice (ECJ). 10
This section does not intend to give a comprehensive overview of  Article 
5(1) and 5(3). In the context of  concurrent liability, the following issues are of  
particular interest. Firstly, the relationship between those provisions – in par-
ticular, whether they are mutually exclusive 11 and require a “channelling” of  
all claims to one head or whether they allow a “splitting” of  the dispute into 
6 Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst, Case 189/87 [1988] ECR 5565.
7 As long as the fi rst proceedings are pending, res judicata issues may arise only if  Arts 27 and 28 
do not apply; however, after termination they arise in any case.
8 See Personal Representatives of  Tang Man Sit v Capacious Investments [1996] AC 514 (PC) [521]–[523] 
(Lord Nicholls).
9 See Cour de Cassation 11.1.1922 D 1922 1 16.
10 Handte v Traitements Mécano-chimiques des Surfaces, Case C-26/91 [1992] ECR I-3967; Kalfelis, supra 
n 6.
11  The question whether these provisions are “all-embracing” (as one might infer from the Kalfelis 
defi nition for matters in tort) is beyond the scope of  this article as it is not of  particular impor-
tance for present purposes. It suffi ces to say that the ECJ accepted in Reichert v Dresdner Bank 
(No 2), Case C-261/90 [1992] ECR I-2149 that there are cases falling within neither Article 
5(1) nor 5(3), there being some additional requirements derived from the words “liability” or 
“harmful event”; see also Kleinwort Benson v Glasgow City Council (No 2) [1999] 1 AC 153 (HL) 
[172] (Lord Goff), [196] (Lord Hutton). 
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different fora. Secondly, whether the claimant can “choose” the jurisdictional 
head by skilful drafting of  his claim; this involves analysis of  whose allegations 
(the claimant’s and/or the defendant’s) are relevant as well as of  the required 
standard of  proof  to bring a claim under either head. Thirdly, whether there 
is “accessory jurisdiction” for related claims in the respective forum.
 1. Relationship between Article 5(1) and 5(3): Mutual 
Exclusivity for the “Entire Dispute” or for Each “Single 
Cause of  Action”?
It is well established that these provisions are “mutually exclusive”. 12 This fol-
lows from the Kalfelis defi nition for “matters relating to tort”,13 and seems not to 
have been questioned so far. However, there is little clarity as to what it exactly 
means. As will become clear, there is an apparent (but so far unexpressed) dis-
sent in the literature and jurisprudence among different Member States; this 
might be traced back to a confusing use of  terminology and a widespread mis-
understanding of  Kalfelis.14
(a) Confusing Use of  Terminology
The terminology used in this context, as to the “object of  mutual exclusivity”, 
differs considerably. 15 This might not surprise as the Judgments Regulation itself  
does not provide for a consistent use of  terminology either. 16 Two concepts may 
be distinguished: the fi rst can be described as the “action as a whole” or the 
12 A Briggs and P Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Informa, 5th edn, 2009), 253; J Fawcett and 
J Carruthers (eds), Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 
14th edn, 2008), 251; J Hill and A Chong, International Commercial Disputes (Hart Publishing, 4th 
edn, 2010), 133–34; Fawcett et al, supra n 4, 57–59.
13 Supra n 6, [18].
14 Supra n 6.
15 Describing the “action as a whole”: Kalfelis, supra n 6, [19]–[20] (“action”, “action/case in 
its entirety”, “same dispute”); describing a “single cause of  action”: Kalfelis, supra n 6, [19]–
[20] (“in so far as it is based”, “different aspects”); P Mankowski, “Art 5” in U Magnus and 
P Mankowski (eds), Brussels I Regulation (Sellier European Law, 2nd edn, 2012), 231–32 (“with 
regard to the single claim”, “issue”); in the German literature/language (see references, infra 
n 24) terms like “Rechtssache/-streit”, “Klage” or “Streitgegenstand” are used for the former, 
“Anspruch/-sgrundlage”, “Klage”, “Fragen”, “Gesichtspunkte”, “Aspekte”, “Haftung/-san-
spruch” for the latter; see in England for the latter, eg: Agnew v Länsforsäkringsbolagens AB [2001] 
1 AC 223 (HL) [244]–[245] (Lord Woolf: “case”, “same issue”, “proceedings”), [267] (Lord 
Millett: “matter”); Source, infra n 26, [63]–[64] (Staughton LJ: “claim”, “causes of  action”); RZB 
v NBG, infra n 27) [411] (Tuckey J: “claim”); Rayner v Davies, infra n 27, [256]–[257] (QB; Mori-
son J: “claim”, “cause of  action”).
16 Describing a “single cause of  action”: “matter(s)” (eg Arts 1(1), 5(1/3), 15(1), 18(1), 25), “claim” 
(Arts 5(4), 6(1/3), 25), “dispute” (Arts 5(5/7), 15(2), 23(1/3)), “proceedings” (Arts 22(1)–(5), 
23(4)), “action” (Arts 6(2), 7, 28/29), “cause of  action” (Art 27); in the German version: 
“Gegenstand des Verfahrens” (eg Arts 5(1/3), 15(1), 18(1)), “Verfahren … zum Gegenstand” 
(Art 22(5)) “-sache” (Arts 1(1), 5(2)), “Klage” (Arts 5(4), 6(1)–(3), 22(1)–(4), 23(4), 27, 28, 29), 
“Streitigkeit” (Arts 5(5/7), 15(2), 25), “Rechtsstreitigkeit” (Art 23(1)), “Anspruch” (Art 27).
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“entire dispute” which comprises so to speak “all causes of  action contained 
in the proceedings/dispute”. The second can be described as the “respective 
single cause of  action/claim” which is a “part of  the action as a whole/entire 
dispute”.
This terminological confusion might have been one of  the reasons which led 
to an apparent consensus that Article 5(1) and 5(3) are “mutually exclusive”; 
however, that confusion in fact conceals two fundamentally different positions:17 
one view assumes “mutual exclusivity” in relation to the “entire dispute”; this 
leads to an exclusion of  tort claims from Article 5(3) as soon as there is a 
contract (however closely related) in the parties’ relationship. The “opposing” 
view conceives “mutual exclusivity” only with regard to each “single cause of  
action”; this allows tort claims to be pursued under Article 5(3) notwithstand-
ing the fact that collateral contractual claims fall under Article 5(1). It will be 
argued that this second approach is, apart from the fact that it accords with the 
ECJ’s view in Kalfelis,18 the better view – at least de lege lata.19
 (b) The Kalfelis Decision: No Accessory Jurisdiction and No Exclusive Effects of  a 
Contract under Article 5(3)
In that case, the claimant based his claim (seeking remedy for a certain sum of  
money as a result of  negligent advice by a bank in fi nancial transactions) on 
contract, tort and unjust enrichment. Firstly, the ECJ established an autono-
mous interpretation of  the concept “matters relating to tort” as covering “all 
actions which seek to establish the liability of  a defendant and which are not 
related to a ‘contract’ within the meaning of  Article 5(1)”.20 This part of  the 
decision is usually referred to as establishing the “mutual exclusivity” between 
Article 5(1) and 5(3). However, the ECJ held, secondly, that “a court which 
has jurisdiction under Article 5(3) over an action in so far as it is based on 
tort or delict does not have jurisdiction over that action in so far as it is not 
so based”;21 in other words, the claimant may pursue his “action” under Arti-
cle 5(3) only (but at least!) in so far as it is based on tort. On the one hand, 
this part of  the decision denies accessory jurisdiction under Article 5(3).22 On 
the other hand, however, the judgment clearly establishes that the mere exist-
ence of  a related contract in the set of  facts (as there was!) cannot suffi ce to 
exclude the claim from Article 5(3). Accordingly, the ECJ acknowledged the 
17 As far as apparent, this dissent has never been properly identifi ed.
18 Supra n 6.
19 See infra, Section B.1(d).
20 Kalfelis, supra n 6, [17]–[18]; see for an interpretation of  that term infra, Section B.1(d)(iii) – Kal-
felis formula.
21 Kalfelis, supra n 6, [19]–[21].
22 See infra, section B.3.
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possibility of  a fragmentation of  a “single dispute” into different fora23 and, 
without saying so explicitly, qualifi ed each cause of  action separately. Conse-
quently, only each such “single cause of  action” is the object of  the “mutual 
exclusivity” dictum.
(c) Confl icting Views in Literature and Case Law
(i) Prevailing View in Germany: Separate Analysis of  Each “Single Cause of  Action” 
and No Exclusive Effects of  a Contract
The prevailing view 24 in many European civil law countries (particularly in 
Germany) appears to be that the existence of  a contract in the parties’ rela-
tionship does not as such exclude tort claims from Article 5(3) and does not 
make them “matters relating to a contract” at the characterisation stage. Arti-
cle 5(3) is not considered subsidiary to Article 5(1) and the availability of  the 
latter does not exclude tort claims from the former; this is sometimes based on 
a correct understanding of  Kalfelis.25 A separate pursuance of  cumulative causes 
of  action under both Article 5(1) and 5(3) is recognised. Although it is accepted 
that Article 5(1) and 5(3) are “mutually exclusive”, they are regarded so only 
in relation to each “single cause of  action”; only in so far the claimant has no 
choice whether to frame his claim in contract or tort. Contractual and tortious 
claims are regarded as separate causes of  action, capable of  being qualifi ed 
independently for jurisdictional purposes. Interestingly, this is not usually con-
sidered as problematic but impliedly assumed as a given.
 (ii) English Case Law: Separate Analysis of  Each “Single Cause of  Action”
It is appropriate to consider next how the English courts dealt with the ques-
tion of  accumulation of  causes of  action and mutual exclusivity. In Source v 
TUV Rheinland Holding 26 the claimant alleged two causes of  action. Firstly, he 
based his claim on a breach of  a contractual obligation to exercise reasonable 
skill and care in the preparation of  quality control inspection reports; secondly, 
23 Cf Kalfelis, supra n 6, [20] where the ECJ noted that resulting disadvantages can be mitigated 
by Arts 2 and 28.
24 BGH 27.5.2008 [2009] IPRax 150–51 (a claim framed solely in tort for negligent medical treat-
ment against a doctor was subsumed under Art 5(3)); BGH 11.2.1988 [1989] IPRax 99; OLG 
Köln 5.4.2005 [2006] WM 124–25; CU Wolf, “Feststellungsklage und Anspruchsgrundlagen-
konkurrenz im Rahmen von Art 5 Nr 1 und Nr 3 LugÜ” [1999] IPRax 85–86; Mankowski, 
supra n 15, 117–19, 231–32; J Kropholler and J von Hein, Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht (Verlag 
Recht und Wirtschaft, 9th edn, 2011), 212; R Geimer, “Art 5” in R Geimer and R Schütze 
(eds), Europäisches Zivilverfahrensrecht (Beck, 3rd edn, 2010), 233–34; A Spickhoff, “Anspruch-
skonkurrenzen, Internationale Zustän digkeit und Internationales Privatrecht” [2009] IPRax 
129; HP Mansel, “Gerichtliche Prüfungsbefugnis im forum delicti” [1989] IPRax 85; see also 
BGH 16.10.1984 [1984] WM 1564 (left it open); contra: OLG München 8.3.1989 [1989] RIW 
903; OLG Koblenz 23.2.1990 [1990] RIW 319 (but differently on similar facts: OLG Koblenz 
25.6.2007 [2009] IPRax 153).
25 Supra n 6; see supra Section B.1(b).
26 Source v TUV Rheinland Holding [1998] QB 54.
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he based it on a tortious breach of  duty for the same reason. The Court of  
Appeal held that “[b]oth the causes of  action” are excluded from Article 5(3) 
“because they are both related to a contract” and that “a claim which may be 
brought under a contract or independently of  a contract on the same facts, 
save that the contract does not need to be established, is [excluded from Article 
5(3)]”. 27 At fi rst sight, one might infer from this judgment that whenever there 
is a contract between the relevant parties (related to the relevant facts), that 
contract necessarily excludes related tort claims from Article 5(3).28 However, 
that conclusion does not necessarily follow from that case. It must be noted that 
the Court of  Appeal, though using the singular and the plural interchangeably, 
effectively qualifi ed both causes of  action separately and held that both are (by 
themselves) related to a contract. The reason for qualifying the tort claim under 
Article 5(1) was not the mere fact that there was a contract between the parties 
but rather the fact that the tortious liability in question (namely the duty of  
care to draw up proper reports) necessarily presupposed such a contract with-
out which this tort could never have existed.29 This is reinforced by the words 
“save that the contract does not need to be established” which seem to indi-
cate that a claim for tortious liability nonetheless falls under Article 5(3) if  that 
liability does not depend on a contract. Consequently, the mere existence of  a 
contract as such does not exclude tort claims from Article 5(3). Examples may 
be claims for product liability by a buyer against his seller/manufacturer30 or 
claims by a patient against his doctor for negligent medical treatment. 31 Both of  
these liabilities, if  framed in tort, do not, under many laws, require the proof  
of  a contract. The tortious duty (not to cause damage by a product and not to 
injure someone physically) exists irrespective of  any contract.
This is in line with the reasoning (obiter) of  Morison J in Rayner v Davies32 who 
was also concerned with a claim for breach of  contract and a claim for breach 
of  a tortious duty of  care to carry out a survey and draw up reports carefully. 
He qualifi ed both causes of  action separately and held that “it is sensible to 
regard both claims as relating to a contract” since “[t]he relationship between 
27 Ibid, [63] (Staughton LJ; emphasis added); in Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich v National Bank of  
Greece [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 408 (Comm) [411], Tuckey J considered Source to have been over-
ruled implicitly by Kleinwort Benson, supra n 11; however, it was approved by Morison J in Rayner 
v Davies [2003] ILPr 14 (QB) [18]–[19]; affi rmed without discussion by the CA, [2002] EWCA 
Civ 1880, [2003] ILPr 15.
28 See Cheshire, supra n 12, 251–52; Fawcett et al, supra n 4, 60–61, 374.
29 Equally: Briggs and Rees, supra n 12, 224, 262.
30 Contra: Ibid, 265, citing Handte, supra n 10, which, however, is far from denying this.
31 BGH 27.5.2008, supra n 24, 150–51; arguably, the physical injury gives prima facie rise to a 
tortious claim. Whether a valid contract or consent by the patient justifi es the injury is a prelim-
inary question (contractual defence to the tort claim) which should not govern the jurisdictional 
qualifi cation: Kropholler and von Hein, supra n 24, 212; S Leible, in T Rauscher (ed), Europäis-
ches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht (vol 1, Sellier European Law, 2011), 264–65; contra: Briggs and 
Rees, supra n 12, 263.
32 Supra n 27, [19].
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the parties which gives rise to the duty in tort is founded upon the contract”. 
As in the Source case, the tort claim “arose precisely because there was a con-
tractual relationship which gave rise to the duty of  care”.
RZB v NBG33 concerned a claim for breach of  contract (an undertaking to 
pay on completion of  certain events and a warranty of  non-default under a 
related loan agreement at that time) and/or negligent misrepresentation. Con-
cerning the latter, Tuckey J essentially left open whether it falls under Article 
5(1) (on the basis that Source34 is still good law) or 5(3) (on the basis that it has 
been overruled by Kleinwort Benson35). The question whether a claim for mis-
representation as such falls within Article 5(1) or 5(3) is beyond the scope of  
this article. However, it is apparent that Tuckey J “split” the action and – just 
as Staughton LJ did in Source36 – qualifi ed the two claims separately.37 Although 
this case can, admittedly, also be resolved by a different route of  reasoning, 
namely that these were “separate claims” concerning different facts,38 Tuckey J 
nonetheless implied – by indicating his opinion that the tort claim falls rather 
under Article 5(3) – that the existence of  a contract as such does not exclude 
related tort claims from that provision.
The alternative way of  reasoning was taken in Domicrest v Swiss Bank39 which 
concerned a contractual claim under an alleged payment order/guarantee and 
(eventualiter) a tortious claim for misrepresentation that such a payment order 
is as good as cash. Rix J held, distinguishing the Source case, that these claims 
are “not parallel” and based on opposite lines of  arguments and therefore the 
latter claim plainly falls within Article 5(3). It suffi ces to say here that even if  
such claims can be said to concern different facts and, accordingly, no (proper) 
accumulation of  causes of  action, the result would be the same a fortiori.
Although there are indications to the contrary,40 it can be concluded that the 
English case law generally favours a separate qualifi cation of  contractual and 
tortious claims, subsuming the latter under Article 5(1) only if  and because it is 
founded upon and necessarily presupposes a contract, but not otherwise, even 
if  a related contract exists between the parties. This approach appears to be 
consistent with the Kalfelis decision.41
33 Supra n 27, [413]–[414].
34 Supra n 26.
35 Supra n 11.
36 Supra n 26.
37 Similarly: Chadwick LJ (obiter) in Viskase v Paul Kiefel [1999] 1 WLR 1305 (CA) [1320].
38 See Fawcett et al, supra n 4, 59.
39 [1999] QB 548 (QB) [561].
40 A uniform qualifi cation appears to have been adopted in (both obiter) Barry v Bradshaw [2000] CLC 
455 (CA) [460] (Aldous LJ) and Mazur Media v Mazur Media [2004] EWHC 1566 (Ch), [2004] 
1 WLR 2966 [2974] (Lawrence Collins J).
41 Supra n 6 and Section B.1(b).
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 (iii) Different View: Uniform Qualifi cation and A Priori Exclusive Effects of  a Contract 
on Tort Claims under Article 5(3)
On the other hand, many authors as well as the Irish High Court 42 counsel a 
view of  uniform qualifi cation of  the entire dispute as well as exclusive effects of  
a contract on tort claims under Article 5(3). Although it is surprisingly obvious 
that the ECJ in fact ruled precisely the opposite,43 Kalfelis44 is often cited as an 
authority supporting such a position.
Burke v Uvex 45 involved a claim by a buyer against his seller (not being the 
manufacturer) for damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by a defective 
product. He based his claim solely on tort of  negligence and breach of  duty at 
common law. The Irish High Court held, (wrongfully) relying on the autono-
mous defi nition in Kalfelis,46 that, although the claim was based solely on tort, 
the “court cannot overlook the existence of  the contractual relationship, how-
ever basic, between the plaintiff  and the … defendant” and that the “plaintiff  
cannot avoid the consequences of  the existence of  that contract by seeking his 
remedy solely in tort”. Therefore, the claimant was prevented from bringing his 
claim under Article 5(3).47 At least the reasoning seems unsound and framed in 
too general terms; the court regarded the mere fact of  a contract’s existence 
between the parties as decisive for the qualifi cation of  the tort claim. It did not 
analyse this claim separately and ask whether the alleged liability is the result 
of  an obligation freely assumed48 (the alleged tort necessarily presupposing a 
contract) or if  the tortious duty exists independently of  any contract. In the 
light of  the reasoning, the court’s answer would probably have been the same 
had the seller also been the manufacturer and had the claim been based solely 
on product liability (which does not presuppose but might still exist alongside 
a contract). It is argued here that it would be wrong to desperately “press” an 
action, which is based on breach of  contract and on product liability, into a 
single category, both claims necessarily being the same, namely contractual, 
merely because the manufacturer happens to be the seller.
However, such a broad reading of  Burke v Uvex49 seems to be supported by 
Briggs and Rees,50 who suggest that Article 5(1) and 5(3) were inspired by the 
42 Burke v Uvex Sports [2005] ILPr 348.
43 See supra, Section B.1(b); accurately: BGH 27.5.2008, supra n 31, 151; Spickhoff, supra n 24, 
129; Wolf, supra n 24, 85–86.
44 Supra n 6.
45 Supra n 42, [354]–[355].
46 Supra n 6.
47 It appears, although this was not necessary to decide, that the court regarded the tort claim as 
contractual, falling under Art 5(1).
48 Handte, supra n 10.
49 Supra n 42.
50 Supra n 12, 253, 263, 265; see also A Briggs, “Choice of  Choice of  Law?” [2003] Lloyds 
Maritime and Commerical Law Quarterly 25, 30, basically stating that if  a claim “arises between 
contracting parties”, any such claim can only be contractual for jurisdictional purposes even if  
it is alleged that the cause of  action does not presuppose a contract.
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French principle of  non-cumul: “[I]f  two parties are bound by a contract and 
a claim falls within the area regulated by that contract, there is no legal pos-
sibility of  a parallel or concurrent remedy in delict.” Similarly, Fawcett et al 51 
categorically state that “claims” cannot be split “because this would breach the 
basic principle [of  mutual exclusivity]”. In Cheshire,52 the view appears to be 
taken (in a hardly understandable analysis) that a contract as such excludes a 
tort claim from Article 5(3) but it does also not fall under Article 5(1) (due to 
the implications in Kleinwort Benson53); it is then concluded “that the tort claim 
disappears altogether [from Article 5]” since accessory jurisdiction under Arti-
cle 5(1) is rejected.
Notably, this view is slightly broader than the one expressed by the English 
courts.54 It implies, allegedly following from the Kalfelis defi nition, that if  there 
is a related contract in the set of  facts, this excludes any tort claim from Article 
5(3) a priori.55 Apparently, this conclusion mainly results from the fact that the 
“action (or the underlying dispute) as a whole” is qualifi ed uniformly, presuppos-
ing that all alleged claims necessarily need to fall under one and the same head. 
A “split of  the action” is, for some unexpressed reason, categorically rejected; 
this results in some sort of  “supremacy of  the contractual forum”. In contrast, 
the English case law suggests a separate qualifi cation and relevance of  the ques-
tion whether each separate cause of  action necessarily presupposes a contract 
or whether such liability exists independently of  any contract. Regarding these 
opposing positions, differences in outcome particularly result in cases of  claims 
based on product liability against the seller/manufacturer or claims based on 
personal injury for negligent medical treatment against a doctor.
( iv) Two Possible Approaches Following a View of  “A Priori Exclusive Effects of  a 
Contract”
If  it were correct that the mere existence of  a contract as such excludes tort 
claims from Article 5(3), the question arises whether such tort claims can be 
brought under Article 5(1). Two answers are conceivable:
(a) On the one hand, it could be followed that any tort claim which arises 
between contractual parties must actually be qualifi ed as a “matter relating to 
contract”; after all, the argument to exclude the tort claim from Article 5(3) was 
because it was said to relate to a contract (not satisfying the Kalfelis defi nition). 
Nonetheless, this is usually made subject to the additional requirement that the 
claim must be based upon a “particular contractual obligation” as laid down in 
51 Supra n 4, 58–59, 374; similarly Briggs and Rees, supra n 12, 220 [1].
52 Supra n 12, 251–52.
53 Supra n 11.
54 See supra, Section B.1(c)(ii).
55 At least as far as the claims are not considered “separate claims” (being based on different 
facts); cf Fawcett et al, supra n 4, 57–61, 374; Cheshire, supra n 12, 252.
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the controversial decision of  Kleinwort Benson.56 However, it is diffi cult to see how 
a tort claim may ever be based on such a contractual obligation being regarded as 
the “obligation in question”. The result would be that the tort claim is excluded 
from Article 5(1) because it is not based on a contract and from Article 5(3) 
because it relates to a contract.57 This reasoning is unsound in principle and 
contains inherent contradictions.
If  it were correct that the tort claim “disappears from Article 5”, a further 
argument may be invoked: if  the claimant pursues the contract claim under 
Article 5(1), this would effectively amount to a substantive waiver of  the tort 
claim,58 unless it would still be possible for him to bring the latter under Article 
2. Such a waiver was certainly not intended by the framers by providing for 
special jurisdiction.59 It follows that it would still be possible to pursue the tort 
claim under Article 2 (to the exclusion of  the already pending contract claim; 
Article 27). Evidently, such a solution would nonetheless involve a splitting of  
the action which was categorically rejected by Fawcett et al.60 For that reason, 
nothing would be gained in terms of  “procedural economy” compared with 
splitting the causes of  action in Article 5(1) and 5(3).
(b) On the other hand, it could be argued that, notwithstanding Klein-
wort Benson,61 the exclusion of  a tort claim from Article 5(3) as a result of  
a contract’s existence automatically means that the tort claim is contractual 
(for jurisdictional purposes) and thus “channelled to Article 5(1) by way of  
characterization”. 62 This type of  channelling is to be distinguished from and 
logically excludes any accessory jurisdiction. 63 It would have, in terms of  proce-
dural economy, the advantage that one and the same dispute would be tried in 
one single forum only. However, there are arguments against such an approach 
which are considered next.
56 Supra n 11.
57 Essentially to that effect: Fawcett et al, supra n 4, 58; Cheshire, supra n 12, 251–52; technically, this 
view still leaves open the question of  accessory jurisdiction under Art 5(1); however, this would 
effectively lead to the same result as to accept that the claim is “contractual” at the outset.
58 At least if  cause of  action preclusion extends to both claims; see infra n 236.
59 See also infra, Section D.4 for the proposition that a judgment on a contractual claim may 
not have res judicata effects on a tort claim if  and because the latter was not and could not be 
heard by the adjudicating court; this would infringe the right to be heard; see also infra, Sec-
tion C.1(b).
60 Supra n 4, 58–59.
61 Supra n 11.
62 Essentially proposed by AG Darmon [1988] ECR 5565 [29]–[30] (rejected in Kalfelis, supra n 
6); Briggs, “choice”, supra n 50, 30; see also OLG Koblenz 23.2.1990, supra n 24, 319; OLG 
München 8.3.1989, supra n 24, 903; OLG Stuttgart 7.8.1998 [1999] IPRax 104.
63 Accessory jurisdiction presupposes that the “accessory claim” does not originally (on its own 
merits) fall under the provision it is “pulled” to; if  a claim is already contractual, there can a 
priori be no question of  accessory jurisdiction under Art 5(1); AG Darmon, supra n 62, [24]; in 
so far inconsistent (or uncritical): L Collins (ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Confl ict of  Laws 
(vol 1, Sweet & Maxwell, 14th edn, 2006), 416; Hill and Chong, supra n 12, 133–34.
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 (d) Arguments against Exclusive Effects of  a Contract and for a Separate Qualifi cation of  
Each “Single Cause of  Action”
In the fi rst place, the ECJ rather clearly rejected any exclusion of  tort claims 
from Article 5(3) by the mere reason of  a contract’s existence; in so far, it pro-
vided for a separate analysis of  each “single cause of  action” under Article 
5.64 On the other hand, there are (at least de lege lata) good arguments for such 
an approach.
(i) Contrary to the Scheme and Objectives of  Article 5(1) and 5(3)
Excluding tort claims from Article 5(3) by reason of  the mere fact that con-
tractual claims exist contradicts the scheme and objectives of  Article 5(1) and 
5(3) which provide for a “friendly coexistence on eye level” rather than for 
“supremacy” of  one or the other provision. Although there is mutual exclusiv-
ity between these provisions, this exists only with regard to each single cause 
of  action. There is no reason why tort claims should be excluded from Article 
5(3) merely because there are contractual claims too. Such an approach would 
unduly – and clearly beyond the text – restrict Article 5(3).65 Regarding the tort 
claim, there is still (and just as much as for the contract claim at the place of  
performance) a “particularly close connecting factor” at the place(s) where the 
harmful event occurred which still “justifi es the attribution of  jurisdiction”.66
Taking the example of  product liability, it is clear that such a claim falls 
plainly within Article 5(3) as between the manufacturer and an end-user. It 
would seem arbitrary and fortuitous if  the latter loses this jurisdictional basis 
against the former if  that happens to be the seller. Since he might not have 
known that the seller is also the manufacturer, this might create unforeseeable 
results and is contrary to the object of  the Regulation to strengthen legal cer-
tainty “by enabling the claimant to identify easily the court in which he may 
sue”.67 If  the Regulation attaches value to the place where the harmful event 
occurred in cases of  product liability, there is absolutely no reason why these 
values should vary only because there is a contract between the parties.
(ii) Uncertain “Scope” of  a Contract’s Exclusive Effects
Another factor creating signifi cant uncertainty and unforeseeability is the fact 
that it is far from clear under which circumstances and conditions a contract 
should exclude tort claims from Article 5(3). In other words, when is the contract 
“closely enough related to the tort” and when does it “merely exist somewhere 
in the facts with an irrelevant remoteness”? A distinction between “parallel 
64 Kalfelis, supra n 6; see supra, Section B.1(b).
65 Wolf, supra n 24, 85–86.
66 See Dumez France v Hessische Landesbank, Case 220/88 [1990] ECR I-49 [17].
67 Fonderie Offi cine Meccaniche Tacconi v Heinrich Wagner Sinto Maschinenfabrik, Case C-334/00 [2002] 
ECR I-7357 [20]; see also Wolf, supra n 24, 86.
50 Contractual and Tortious Causes of  Action under the Judgments Regulation April 2013
claims” and “separate claims” (being based on “different facts”) appears to lack 
the desired clarity too.68
 (iii) Relevance of  the Defendant’s Invocation/Proof  of  a Contract?
If  the claimant bases his claim on tort, without mentioning or pleading any 
contract in the delictual forum, the question arises whether the defendant can 
avoid Article 5(3) jurisdiction by invoking (and possibly proving) a contract. The 
ECJ case law appears to suggest that, as a matter of  principle, any defences 
by the defendant are irrelevant for the qualifi cation under Article 5(1) or 5(3):69
(a) Gantner principle. For the purposes of  lis pendens, the ECJ held in Gantner 
Electronic v Basch Exploitatie Maatschappij 70 that account can be taken only of  the 
claimant’s claim and not of  the defendant’s defences. This follows particularly 
from the fact that lis pendens already exists at a time before the defendant has 
had an opportunity to submit his defences. If  the “content and nature of  the 
claims could be modifi ed by arguments necessarily submitted … by the defend-
ant”, the “purpose of  [Article 27] would be frustrated”; in particular, because it 
may have the result that a “court initially designated as having jurisdiction … 
would subsequently have to decline to hear the case”. It follows that a defend-
ant’s invocation (and proof) of  a contract cannot not make the cause of  action 
a different one.
Although this judgment was only concerned with lis pendens, it can be argued 
that similar considerations should apply regarding the jurisdictional qualifi ca-
tion; at least in relation to Article 5(1) and 5(3): contractual and tortious claims 
are different causes of  action under Article 27.71  Certainly, as long as no con-
tract is mentioned, a court may impossibly treat the claim as a contractual one. 
Consequently, it appears to follow from Gantner72 that the defendant’s invocation 
of  a contract cannot make a claim originally pleaded solely in tort a contrac-
tual and thus a different one. The defendant’s defences must be irrelevant also 
for the jurisdiction-allocation between Article 5(1) and 5(3).
(b) Effer line of  case law. A similar argument might be derived from Effer v 
Kantner73  where the ECJ held that Article 5(1) jurisdiction includes the power to 
consider the existence of  the contract itself  and that the claimant may invoke 
68 Cf Fawcett et al, supra n 4, 59–60, 322, 374; Cheshire, supra n 12, 252.
69 A different question is, however, whether the mere allegation of  a tort/contract claim by the 
claimant suffi ces to establish jurisdiction under Art 5; see for the relevant standard of  proof  
infra, Section B.2(b).
70 Gantner Electronic v Basch Exploitatie Maatschappij Case C-111/01 [2003] ECR I-4207 [26]-[32].
71 This follows rather clearly from Owners of  the cargo lately laden on board the ship Tatry v Owners of  
the ship Maciej Rataj, Case C-406/92 [1994] ECR I-5439 [38] and Maersk Olie & Gas v Firma M 
de Haan en W de Boer, Case C-39/02 [2004] ECR I-9657 [37]–[39]; see infra, Section C.1.
72 Supra n 70.
73 Effer v Kantner Case 38/81 [1982] ECR 825 [7]–[8].
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that provision even if  the defendant disputes the existence of  a contract. It 
can be argued that this effectively means that the defendant’s denial of  a contract 
(even if  he proves the non-existence) cannot alter the qualifi cation under Arti-
cle 5(1).74 This is reinforced by Boss Group v Boss France75  where Saville LJ held 
that even the claimant’s denial of  a contract cannot alter that qualifi cation. These 
principles have been extended to Article 5(3) in Equitas v Wave City Shipping76 
 and recently by the ECJ in Folien Fischer v Ritrama.77
 Likewise, it is arguable that in the delictual forum the defendant’s allegation of  
a contract (even if  he proves its existence) cannot alter the qualifi cation under 
Article 5(3). It appears from this line of  case law, just as it does from Gantner78 
in relation to Article 27, that it is the claimant who exclusively defi nes the juris-
dictional basis as regards Article 5(1) and 5(3).
(c) Ka lfelis formula. The Kalfelis defi nition79 itself  requires (apart from pos-
sible further requirements80) an action which (i) seeks81 to establish the liability 
of  the defendant and (ii) is not related to a contract within the meaning of  
Article 5(1) (wherever the dividing line may be). It seems that no harm is done 
to that defi nition if  it is reformulated as requiring an “action which is based on 
non-contractual liability” or an “action based on a rule of  law which provides 
for liability irrespective of  and not requiring proof  of  a contract”. If  this read-
ing is correct, it suggests that the relevant criterion is in particular the rule of  
law the action is based upon; this must be one which does not presuppose an 
obligation freely assumed. Apparently, it is the claimant who bases his claim on 
a certain rule of  law; defences by the defendant can only convince the court 
that that rule of  law does not apply on the facts.
(i v) Separate Qualifi cation: Several and Different Causes of  Action under Article 27
It is concluded that the “mutual exclusivity dictum” should be interpreted nar-
rowly as referring only to each “single cause of  action” in the dispute, each 
of  which must be qualifi ed separately (whether each on its own relates to a 
contract). It remains to be discussed what “single cause of  action” means. The 
Judgments Regulation uses many different terms in this context.82 However, no 
clear logic behind the use of  these and no distinct meaning can be identifi ed; 
74 See infra, Section B.2(b)(i); alternatively, it could also be argued that Effer, supra n 73, means 
that the defendant’s denial at least requires the claimant to establish a good arguable case that 
a contract exists at the jurisdictional stage (still leaving open a negative fi nding on the merits).
75 Boss Group v Boss France [1997] 1 WLR 351 (CA).
76 Equitas v Wave City Shipping [2005] EWHC 923 (Comm).
77 Folien Fischer v Ritrama Case C-133/11 [2012] ECR I-0000; see infra, Section B.2(b)(iii).
78 Supra n 70.
79 Supra n 6, [17].
80 See supra n 11.
81 It can be said that it is the claimant who seeks (by bringing such an action) to establish the lia-
bility of  the defendant.
82 See supra n 16.
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this becomes particularly evident on a closer comparison of  the different lan-
guage versions. It rather seems that all of  these terms are (and should be) used 
as synonyms, namely describing a “single cause of  action”.
In The Tatry83  the ECJ interpreted the term “cause of  action” in Article 27 
as “compris[ing] the facts and the rule of  law relied on as the basis of  the 
action”. Furthermore, it added the concept of  the “same object” which is not 
contained in the English language version.84  It could be argued that, in order 
to create a “consistent jurisdictional system” within the Judgments Regulation, 
the same defi nition should be adopted for qualifi cation purposes. Whether this 
is correct in general, cannot be answered conclusively in this article. However, 
it might be said that at least if  different “causes of  action” for the purposes of  
lis pendens are at issue, it is possible and necessary to qualify them separately 
for jurisdictional purposes as, for example, one falling under Article 5(1) and 
the other under Article 5(3) or both falling under the same head. It is rather 
clear that two claims based on different facts must be qualifi ed separately. If  
these claims are, however, based on the same facts but on different rules of  
law, it seems logical that they are to be qualifi ed separately as well.85 Otherwise, 
if  they are to be qualifi ed uniformly (as both together being necessarily either 
contractual or tortious), this would indeed lead to an exclusion of  tort claims 
from Article 5(3). However, it is diffi cult to see how Article 27 might treat as 
two distinct and different things86 what has been considered as one composite 
unit one logical step before.
(e) Conclusion
There is, probably enhanced by an unsophisticated use of  terminology, con-
siderable uncertainty as to the “object of  qualifi cation” under Article 5. It 
is submitted that each “single cause of  action” (particularly contractual and 
tortious claims) ought to be qualifi ed separately, the relevant question being 
whether each on its own merits relates to a contract within the meaning of  
Article 5(1) or is based on non-contractual liability. Accordingly, Article 5(1) 
and 5(3) are “mutually exclusive” only with regard to each such single cause 
of  action. Furthermore, it is concluded that the mere existence of  a contract in 
the set of  facts does not, as such, exclude tort claims from Article 5(3) a priori.
83 Supra n 71, [38].
84 Gubisch Maschinenfabrik v Palumbo, Case 144/86 [1987] ECR 4861 [14]; The Tatry, supra n 71, 
[37], [40].
85 Whether the concept of  the “same object” is relevant as well can be left open for present pur-
poses as contractual and tortious claims are already based on different rules of  law; see infra, 
Section C.1.
86 See for a discussion whether a contractual and a tortious claim constitute one or several causes 
of  action for purposes of  Art 27 infra, Section C.1(c).
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2. Claimant’s Free Choice of  the Jurisdictional Rule?87
(a) Overview
The purpose of  this article is not to draw the demarcation between Article 
5(1) and 5(3) in detail; however, the question shall be examined whether and 
to what extent the claimant is free to “choose”, by skilful drafting of  his claim, 
the jurisdictional rule.88
It is submitted that the defendant’s invocation of  a contract in the delict-
ual forum has no effects as to the qualifi cation under Article 5(3).89 In so far, 
it is the claimant who exclusively defi nes the dispute and, accordingly, allocates 
the applicable jurisdictional rule. However, this does not answer the question 
whether it is suffi cient for the claimant to simply allege a “contract- independent 
liability” in the delictual forum (or a “contract-dependent liability” in the con-
tractual forum), being entirely free to choose the jurisdictional rule, or if  and to 
what extent he has to prove the jurisdictional requirements. Delicate questions as 
to the appropriate standard of  proof  arise. Since this issue is in extricably linked 
with the subject matter of  this article, it will be considered to some extent.
(b ) Standard of  Proof: Necessity to Prove the Existence of  a Contract/Tort?
(i ) Dispute about a Contract’s Existence
It seems well established that the relevant standard of  proof  under the Judg-
ments Regulation is a question of  national law.90 As far as English law is 
concerned, the claimant is required, as a general rule, to show a “good argu-
able case” that all jurisdictional requirements are met.91  As regards Article 5(1), 
it is usually supposed that a claimant is required to establish a good arguable 
case as to the existence of  a contract.92  However, this is doubtful. On the one 
hand, Article 5(1) actually requires “matters relating to a contract” but not nec-
87 See comprehensively as regards choice of  law: Briggs, “choice”, supra n 50.
88 Generally, such possibility is denied: Briggs and Rees, supra n 12, 261–62; Briggs, “choice”, supra 
n 50, 25; Cheshire, supra n 12, 251; Hill and Chong, supra n 12, 133.
89 See supra, Section B.1(d)(iii).
90 Shevill v Presse Alliance, Case C-68/93 [1995] ECR I-415 [35]–[38]; Briggs and Rees, supra n 12, 
249–50, 345–46; the Schlosser Report, [1979] OJ C59/82 [22] is rather ambiguous.
91 Canada Trust v Stolzenberg (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 1 (HL) [13] (Lord Steyn, applying the standard 
as established in Seaconsar Far East v Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran [1994] 1 AC 438 (HL) for 
permission to serve process out of  jurisdiction under the traditional rules, CPR 6.36); Hill and 
Chong, supra n 12, 88; contra: Briggs and Rees, supra n 12, 344–48, favouring a “better of  the 
argument-test”; similarly RZB v NBG, supra n 27, [411].
92 Briggs and Rees, supra n 12, 249–50; Cheshire, supra n 12, 234; RZB v NBG, supra n 27, [411]–
[412]; see also Dicey, supra n 63, 410 still proposing a test for a “serious question which calls for 
a trial”, based on Tesam Distribution v Schuh Mode Team [1990] ILPr 149 (CA) [21]–[24] (Nicholls 
LJ), [44]–[45] (Stocker LJ), decided prior to Canada Trust, supra n 91; differently: Kleinwort Benson, 
supra n 11, [182]–[184] (Lord Clyde); T Hartley, “Article 5(1): ‘Place of  Performance of  the 
Obligation in Question’” [1982] European Law Review 236. 
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essarily “a contract”; on the other hand, the case law points in a different 
direction.
(a) The Effer and Boss decisions. It emerges from Effer93 that the mere 
allegation by the defendant that no contract exists does not as such deprive 
the court of  Article 5(1) jurisdiction; the claimant may invoke that provision 
notwithstanding such denial. This principle has been extended in Boss v Boss;94 
Saville LJ held that there is Article 5(1) jurisdiction even in the opposite case, 
where it is the claimant who denies the contract (in an application for negative 
declaration to that effect),95 and that there are nonetheless “matters relating to 
a contract” in such a case because there is a “lively dispute between the par-
ties as to whether there is a contract between them”. In particular, the claimant 
may “establish a good arguable case that there is a matter relating to a contract 
by relying on the fact that this is what the [defendant is] contending against 
[him]” – unless the defendant withdraws his contentions. If  that case has been 
decided correctly,96 it establishes that the claimant, at least in an application 
for negative declaration, does not have to establish a good arguable case that a 
contract exists but it is suffi cient merely to point to the fact that the defendant 
asserts a contract. In other words, a good arguable case for a “matter relat-
ing to a contract” is shown if  a “lively dispute” concerning the existence of  a 
contract is established.
(b) Mere allegation or good arguable case for a contract’s existence? 
Regarding the Effer-type of  case, where it is the defendant who denies the con-
tract, the general view97 is that the claimant’s mere allegation of  a contract as 
such is not suffi cient but he still has to show a good arguable case for its exist-
ence. Only if  the court fi nds in the affi rmative at the jurisdictional stage does 
93 Supra n 73; similar principles apply as regards the existence of  a tenancy under Art 22(1) (Sand-
ers v Van der Putte, Case 73/77 [1977] ECR 2383) and the existence/validity of  a jurisdiction 
agreement (Benincasa v Dentalkit, Case C-269/95 [1997] ECR I-3767).
94 Supra n 75, [356]–[357].
95 This extension of  the Effer doctrine to negative declarations appears to have been confi rmed by 
the ECJ in the recent decision of  Folien Fischer, supra n 77, where it held that (even) an action 
for negative declaration seeking to establish the absence of  liability in tort falls within Art 5(3); 
the same must apply to Art 5(1) a fortiori.
96 Affi rmed in Youell v La Réunion Aérienne [2009] EWCA Civ 175, [2009] 1 CLC 336 [37]–[38] 
(Collins LJ); mentioned with approval in Kleinwort Benson, supra n 11, [182] (Lord Clyde); Agnew, 
supra n 15, [258] (Lord Hope); favouring such a view: Hill and Chong, supra n 12, 138 (only 
for that part of  the decision); C Forsyth, “Brussels Convention Jurisdiction ‘In Matters Relating 
to a Contract’ when the Plaintiff  Denies the Existence of  a Contract” [1996] Lloyds Maritime 
and Commercial Law Quarterly 330–32; E Peel, “Jurisdiction over Non-existent Contracts” (1996) 
112 Law Quarterly Review 542; I Turkki, “Taking Jurisdiction where the Existence of  a Contract 
is Contested” [1996] European Law Review 420–21; doubt has been expressed in Agnew, supra n 
15, [264] (Lord Millett); Dicey, supra n 63, 409–10; Cheshire, supra n 12, 234–35; however, these 
doubts should now have been removed by the ECJ in Folien Fischer, supra n 77.
97 See supra n 92.
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Effer 98 apply and its jurisdiction “includes the power to consider the existence 
of  the … contract itself ”, a binding judgment being issued even if  it will be 
found on the merits that there was no contract after all. However, if  it decides 
that there is not even a good arguable case for its existence, it has to decline 
jurisdiction and cannot issue a binding judgment on the merits to that effect.
However, that latter inference needs not necessarily to be drawn from Effer.99 
There are good arguments that the contractual forum has jurisdiction to decide 
upon a mere allegation of  a contract (and render a binding judgment on the 
merits) since that is still a “matter relating to a contract”: Firstly, it follows 
from Boss v Boss100 that in a case where the defendant alleges a contract but the 
claimant denies it (in an application for negative declaration), no good argu-
able case that a contract exists must be shown but it is suffi cient to point to a 
“lively dispute”. There is no obvious reason why this should be different due 
to the mere fact that it is the defendant who denies the contract; the standard 
of  proof  (or the “subject to be proved”) should not depend on the procedural 
roles of  the parties.101
Secondly, although such a proposal would at fi rst sight considerably favour 
the claimant, it is hard to see what he would gain by it; if  he is not able to 
show a good arguable case, he will be bound to lose on the merits.102 Moreover, 
such a decision would even have res judicata effect, preventing the unsuccessful 
claimant from suing all over again in another court, which is obviously in the 
interests of  the defendant. Admittedly, there is some danger for the latter if  
he remains passively in the procedure (but has somehow disputed the contract) 
and risks a default-judgment. Furthermore, there is some potential for nuisance 
or vexation by the claimant. Although the latter problem might be resolved by 
the doctrine of  abuse of  process,103 this solution is obviously not without disad-
vantages either; however, it still seems to be the most sensible one.
Obviously, such an approach requires some limitation of  the court’s jurisdic-
tion under Article 5(1) to prevent abuse. In particular, the claimant cannot be 
allowed simply to invoke a contract (or apply for declaration of  its non-exist-
ence) and obtain jurisdiction over related tort claims.104 Rather, the contractual 
forum taking jurisdiction to decide a “lively dispute over a contract’s exist-
ence” (on the basis that this dispute is a “matter relating to contract”) should 
prima facie be limited to decide that dispute. As Lord Clyde put it in Klein-
wort Benson,105 “[i]n such a case if  the court holds that there never has been 
98 Supra n 73, [7].
99 Supra n 73.
100 Supra n 75.
101 Kleinwort Benson, supra n 11, [182]–[184] (Lord Clyde).
102 Hartley, supra n 92, 236.
103 Ibid.
104 Accessory jurisdiction is inappropriate for several other grounds, too; see infra, Section B.3.
105 Supra n 11, [182]–[184].
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a contract its jurisdiction will not extend beyond the decision on that point”; 
however, there is jurisdiction to decide with fi nality on the contract’s exist-
ence. Although it would certainly be convenient to give one court the power 
to decide the entire dispute, such apparent convenience “cannot be allowed to 
overcome the jurisdictional rules set out in the [Regulation]”. On the other 
hand, if  it holds that a contract exists, its jurisdiction “extends” to adjudicate 
upon the contractual consequences for which remedy was sought (but still not 
to a further-reaching accessory jurisdiction for related tortious claims).106
(ii) Common Ground about a Contract’s (Non-)Existence
By contrast, where it is common ground between the parties that a contract 
exists, it is clear that the court has jurisdiction to decide all contractual issues.107 
More diffi cult are cases where it is common ground that no contract has ever 
existed. Boss v Boss108 does not apply in such a situation since there is “no lively 
dispute concerning a contract’s existence”. However, whether and in what cir-
cumstances such a matter comes within Article 5(1) is beyond the scope of  this 
article.109
(ii i) Extension to Matters Relating to Tort
The principles of  Effer110 and Boss v Boss,111 as set out above, have been gen-
erally extended to “matters relating to tort” by Clarke J in Equitas.112 A claim 
for declaration that no tort has been committed falls within Article 5(3); the 
claimant does not have to establish a good arguable case that such tort was 
committed (which is exactly what he denies) but only to point to the defend-
ant’s contentions. Just as under Article 5(1), it is diffi cult to see why this should 
be different only because the procedural roles are reversed.113
This approach was recently confi rmed by the ECJ in Folien Fischer114 w here it 
held that an action for a negative declaration, in which the natural defendant 
(alleged tortfeasor) seeks to establish that the natural claimant (alleged victim) 
has no claim in tort, still falls within Article 5(3); the procedural roles of  the 
parties are irrelevant for the application of  that provision. Furthermore, the 
ECJ,115 just as A-G Jääskinen,116 appears to have indicated that the admissibility 
of  a negative declaration, particularly the required legal interest of  the claim-
106 See infra, Section B.3.
107 Kleinwort Benson, supra n 11, [182]–[184] (Lord Clyde).
108 Supra n 75.
109 See the controversial decision of  Kleinwort Benson, supra n 11.
110 Supra n 73.
111 Supra n 75.
112 Supra n 76.
113 Ibid, [11].
114 Supra n 77, [36]–[55]; contra: A-G Jääskinen [2012] ECR I-0000 [29]–[30].
115 Folien Fischer, supra n 77, [24], [50].
116 Supra n 114, [35].
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ant to pursue such an action, is a question of  national procedural law.117 This 
might mean that requirements such as a “lively dispute about a contract’s or 
tort’s existence” or whether the defendant has “withdrawn his contentions”118 
are part of  the national procedural law (and not Article 5).
(c) Conclusion
The case law referred to above seems to indicate that Article 5(1) and 5(3) 
(and, if  relevant, national procedural law) do not, in fact, presuppose the exist-
ence of  a contract/tort (namely the showing of  a good arguable case to that 
effect) but only, if  such is not common ground, a “genuine and lively dispute” 
between the parties as to the existence. If  that is correct, read together with 
the Kalfelis defi nition as reformulated above,119 it is suffi cient for the claimant (to 
come within Article 5(3)) simply to allege a rule of  law providing for “contract-
independent liability” and that the defendant is liable under it; then, the court 
must render a binding judgment on the merits.120 Cons equently, the claimant 
may well “avoid the consequences of  the existence of  [a] contract by seeking 
his remedy solely in tort”;121 rather, there is nothing the defendant can do to 
avoid jurisdiction under Article 5(3) (as well as under Article 5(1)). This coin-
cides with the conclusion that the defendant’s invocation of  a contract cannot 
oust Article 5(3) jurisdiction.122 Evidently, such jurisdiction must be limited to 
the issue whether or not a contract/tort exists (if  it is found that it does not) 
in order to protect the interests of  the defendant.
 3. Accessory Jurisdiction for Related Claims?
(a) Overview
Eventually, the question must be answered whether a court having juris-
diction under Article 5(1) or 5(3) can also adjudicate upon related tortious 
or contractual claims, respectively (accessory jurisdiction).123 It is established that 
the Judgments Regulation does not contain a general jurisdictional basis for 
117 However, the last word might not have been spoken by the ECJ concerning that question; par-
ticularly in relation to Art 27, there is confl icting case law: cf eg BGE 136 III 523 [6] (holding 
that Art 27 [of  the LugC] allows national procedural law to require a specifi c legal interest for 
an action for negative declaration); BGH 11.12.1996 [1997] IPRax 350 (basically providing for 
a duty based on European law to hear an application for negative declaration in a lis pendens 
situation).
118 These requirements are implied in Boss, supra n 75 and Equitas, supra n 76.
119 See supra, Section B.1(d)(iii) – Kalfelis formula.
120 To that effect: HGer Zürich 11.7.1994 [1996] SZIER 75–76.
121 Contra: Burke v Uvex, supra n 42, [354].
122 See supra, Section B.1(d)(iii).
123 This question does not arise as far as the claim “originally” falls under the respective provision; 
see supra n 63.
58 Contractual and Tortious Causes of  Action under the Judgments Regulation April 2013
“related actions”; such can neither be derived from Article 28 124 nor from Arti-
cle 6. In Kalfelis 125 the ECJ rejected accessory jurisdiction under Article 5(3); it 
held that a court having jurisdiction under that provision has no jurisdiction in 
so far as the “action” (ie the “action as a whole”) is not based on tort, in par-
ticular as regards contractual claims. Whether accessory jurisdiction exists for 
the opposite case, namely for related tortious claims under Article 5(1), is an 
open question. It is more than likely that the ECJ would decide likewise. 126 The 
prevailing doctrine, 127 however, advocates accessory jurisdiction under Article 
5(1) for related tort claims but not for the opposite case under Article 5(3) (the 
isolated tort claim still being pursuable in the delictual forum). It is argued that 
the contractual claim is the “superior” claim and constitutes the “main body” 
of  the dispute, whereas the tort claim is considered ancillary. Another school 
of  thought 128 supports the view that, notwithstanding Kalfelis,129 there is acces-
sory jurisdiction under both provisions, even Article 5(3) attracting jurisdiction 
for related contractual claims. 
(b) Procedural Economy: Split and Consolidation of  Proceedings
The main argument favouring accessory jurisdiction is based on the desire to 
save time and costs in the proceedings (“procedural economy”). This requires 
not splitting up what is in fact a “single dispute” and not limiting the “legal 
124 Elefanten Schuh v Jacqmain, Case 150/80 [1981] ECR 1671 [19]; Réunion Européenne v Spliethoff ’s 
Bevrachtingskantoor, Case C-51/97 [1998] ECR I-6511 [39]–[40]; Leathertex Divisione Sintetici v 
Bodetex, Case C-420/97 [1999] ECR I-6747 [38].
125 Supra n 6, [19]–[21]; affi rmed in Réunion Européenne, supra n 124, [49] (see for the confusion with 
Art 6(1) infra, Section C.2) and Freeport v Arnoldsson, Case C-98/06 [2007] ECR I-8319 [43]–
[46]; see also BGH 28.2.1996 [1996] NJW 1413; BGH 7.12.2004 [2006] IPRax 41–44; HGer 
Zürich 11.7.1994, supra n 120, 75–76.
126 Denying accessory jurisdiction (also) under Art 5(1): Watson v First Choice Holidays [2002] ILPr 
1 (CA) [38] (Lloyd J); Mankowski, supra n 15, 117–19; G Walter and T Domej, Internationales 
Zivilprozessrecht der Schweiz (Haupt Verlag, 5th edn, 2012), 212; D Looschelders, “Internationale 
Zuständigkeit für Ansprüche aus Darlehen nach dem EuGVÜ” [2006] IPRax 15–16; left open: 
OLG Köln 5.4.2005, supra n 24, 125; BGE 133 III 282 [3.5.2].
127 Briggs and Rees, supra n 12, 247–49; 280 (but cf 219-20); Kropholler and von Hein, supra 
n 24, 210–12; Leible, supra n 31, 248–49; Spickhoff, supra n 24, 131–33; M Lohse, Das Verhält-
nis von Vertrag und Delikt (VVF, 1991), 25–32; DA Hofmann and OM Kunz, in C Oetiker and 
T Weibel (eds), Basler Kommentar: Lugano-Übereinkommen (Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag, 2011), 189; 
P Oberhammer, “Art 5” in P Oberhammer and F Dasser (eds), Lugano-Übereinkommen: Kommen-
tar (Stämpfl i, 2nd edn, 2011), 159; D Acocella, in AK Schnyder (ed), Lugano-Übereinkommen zum 
internationalen Zivilverfahrensrecht: Kommentar (Dike, 2011), 195–96.
128 Most prominently: Geimer, “Zivilverfahrensrecht”, supra n 24, 200, 233–34; R Geimer, “Streit-
genossenzuständigkeit und forum delicti commissi” [1988] NJW 3090; P Gottwald, “Europäische 
Gerichtspfl ichtigkeit kraft Sachzusammenhangs” [1989] IPRax 273–74; Wolf, supra n 24, 87; 
see also H Roth, “Gespaltener Gerichtsstand”, in P Gottwald and H Roth (eds), Festschrift für 
 Ekkehard Schumann zum 70 Geburtstag (Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 359–71, erroneously deriving such a 
conclusion from considerations of  (irrelevant) German procedural law. 
129 Supra n 6.
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cognition ”130 of  courts since this would cause expensive and burdensome paral-
lel proceedings and also heighten the risk of  irreconcilable judgments. However, 
it can be objected that even if  accessory jurisdiction was allowed, it is still sub-
ject to the claimant’s will to make use of  this attraction (being an “additional 
jurisdictional basis”) or to pursue the claims under Article 5(1) and 5(3) sepa-
rately.131 Accordingly, a split of  proceedings cannot necessarily be avoided at 
the outset.
Nonetheless, the claimant is still free to pursue all claims together under 
Article 2. In this context, it is often stated that Article 28 might also provide 
for an appropriate instrument.132 An application for subsequent consolidation 
under Article 28(2) (whether by the claimant or the defendant) requires that 
the court fi rst seised has original jurisdiction over the related claim (under a 
provision other than Article 28133). However, if  the claimant sues separately 
under Article 5(1) and 5(3), denying accessory jurisdiction under these provi-
sion precisely means that the court fi rst seised lacks jurisdiction over the related 
claim. Evidently, an application for consolidation may in this context only be 
successful if  the court fi rst seised has jurisdiction under Article 2 (the claimant 
confi ning the action to the contractual or the tortious claim).
Generally, only disadvantages of  the claimant are pointed out in this 
context;134 however, the defendant may also be adversely affected if  the claim-
ant chooses to pursue his claims separately as he has to face two sets of  
proceedings and might be induced to settlement. The defendant might effect 
“consolidation” of  related claims by entering an appearance (Article 24) if  the 
related claim (for which the court would otherwise not have jurisdiction) has 
been pleaded by the claimant and is not pending in another forum yet. That 
might also be possible by fi ling a counter-claim for declaration of  non-existence 
of  the related claim (Article 6(3)), but again only if  that is not yet pending 
in another court. On the other hand, if  the claimant has already brought 
both claims in different fora, there is nothing the defendant can do to consoli-
date the two proceedings if  accessory jurisdiction is not allowed (Article 28(2) 
accordingly not being applicable). 
It follows that the concept of  accessory jurisdiction would indeed gain some-
thing (although little) in terms of  procedural economy since only then might 
Article 28(2) apply, being the only instrument for consolidation available con-
130 This expression is mainly used in the civil law tradition to express the extent of  the court’s 
power to determine and to apply the applicable law to a given set of  facts in order to examine 
whether a remedy sought is to be granted; an “all-embracing legal cognition” follows from the 
principle that the court applies the (entire) law ex offi cio (iura novit curia).
131 A split would be prevented by a “channelling to Article 5(1)” at the characterisation stage (see 
supra, Section B.1(c)(iv), subsection (b)); however, there are (at least de lege lata) good arguments 
against such exclusive effects of  a contract; see supra, Section B.1(d).
132 See eg Kalfelis, supra n 6, [20].
133 See supra n 124.
134 See eg Kalfelis, supra n 6, [20].
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trary to the will of  the claimant. However, to express it in the words of  Lord 
Clyde in a related context, such apparent procedural convenience “cannot be 
allowed to overcome the jurisdictional rules set out in the [Regulation]”.135
(c) Affected Parties’ Interests and Potential Abuse
It is argued that the claimant would be unreasonably disfavoured if  he had to 
sue in different fora and that the defendant’s additional burden would be mini-
mal since he has to face proceedings in that forum anyway and that it would 
rather be in the latter’s interests (too) to have only one set of  proceedings. How-
ever, it can be objected that the claimant can still pursue all claims together 
under Article 2; his interests are not signifi cantly affected since he is not at all 
forced to maintain multiple proceedings. On the other hand, accessory juris-
diction would provide him an additional jurisdictional basis that he would 
otherwise not have and give rise to unwelcome forum shopping. Although it 
is true that it is usually in the defendant’s interests to have only one set of  
proceedings, it is likewise in his interests to be sued at his domicile as far as 
possible.
More importantly, accessory jurisdiction would enable the claimant to 
(abusively) obtain unjustifi ed jurisdictional bases: taking the view that a good 
arguable case for the contract/tort’s existence must be established by the claim-
ant to come within Article 5(1) or 5(3),136 he might obtain jurisdiction for a 
related claim by merely showing a good arguable case for the principal claim, 
although exactly knowing that, on the merits, he will not be able to prove the 
latter. Taking the view that, as argued here, the claimant may obtain juris-
diction by mere allegation (whereupon the court renders a binding judgment 
at least on the existence of  a contract/tort),137 the potential for abuse is even 
more evident.
(d) Restrictive Interpretation of  Article 5
Other convincing arguments can be derived from the scheme and objectives 
of  the Judgments Regulation: the ECJ is keen to emphasise the exceptional 
character of  Article 5 which is interpreted restrictively, not undermining the 
principle of  actor sequitur forum rei.138 Evidently, any accessory jurisdiction would 
unduly broaden the wording of  Article 5(1) and 5(3) and pierce the bounds 
between these provisions which are clearly distinguished in the Regulation. It 
would in many cases effectively lead to another (or two other) jurisdictional 
135 Kleinwort Benson, supra n 11, [183].
136 See supra n 92.
137 See supra, Section B.2(b).
138 Kalfelis, supra n 6, [19]; Handte, supra n 10, [14]; but cf  Engler v Janus Versand, Case C-27/02 
[2005] ECR I-481 [48], held that “matters relating to contract” are “not interpreted narrowly”.
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basis with unlimited legal cognition and reduce the importance of  Article 2. 
Furthermore, the raison d’être of  Article 5(1) and 5(3) is the existence of  a “par-
ticularly close connecting factor between a dispute and the court”.139 However, 
su ch a close connecting factor would not exist in relation to the accessory 
claim. An argumentum e contrario can, moreover, be derived from Article 6 which 
exhaustively provides for fora connexitatis.
Sometimes, arguments are based on a strand of  ECJ case law directing 
towards a “centralization of  jurisdiction”.140 However, such an approach was 
clearly rejected in Kalfelis.141 Furthermore, the ECJ held in Leathertex142 that the 
contractual forum does not even have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon related 
contractual claims; it must follow a fortiori that it certainly does not have so for 
related tortious claims.
(e) Consequen ce: Limited Legal Cognition
It is submitted that, overall, the better view is (at least de lege lata) that neither 
Article 5(1) nor 5(3) provide for accessory jurisdiction. In other words, the con-
tractual forum can adjudicate only upon contractual claims, the tortious forum 
only upon tortious claims. As a logical consequence of  this conclusion, a court 
assuming jurisdiction under Article 5(1) or 5(3) has, in civil law terminology,143 
only a limited legal cognition.144,145 Considering whether or not to grant the 
relief  sought, the court’s power to determine and apply the applicable law is 
limited to the “law of  contracts” or the “law of  torts”, respectively.146
Many legal systems know the principles of  iura novit curia and da mihi facta, 
dabo tibi ius, namely that the court knows and applies the (entire) law ex offi cio 
and that the parties do not have to plead and prove the law (at least the lex 
139 See eg Handelskwekerij GJ Bier v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace, Case 21/76 [1976] ECR 1735 [11]; 
Martin Peters Bauunternehmung v Zuid Nederlandse Aannemers Vereniging, Case 34/82 [1983] ECR 987 
[11].
140 Concerning the maxim accessorium sequitur principale: Shenavai v Kreischer, Case 266/85 [1987] 
ECR 239; see also Peters, supra n 139, [12], [17]; Besix v Wasserreinigungsbau Alfred Kretzschmar, 
Case C-256/00 [2002] ECR I-1699 [27]; Gabriel, Case C-96/00 [2002] ECR I-6367 [55]–[58].
141 Supra n 6; see also AG Geelhoed [2002] ECR I-7357 [27]–[29].
142 Supra n 124, [38]–[42]; see also De Bloos v Société en commandite par actions Bouyer, Case 14/76 
[1976] ECR 1497 [11]–[13] as regards the “obligation in question”.
143 See supra n 130.
144 Accurately: Hofmann and Kunz, supra n 127, 189; Walter and Domej, supra n 126, 212; using 
the German word “Kognitionsbefugnis” (but favouring accessory jurisdiction): Geimer, “Zivil-
verfahrensrecht”, supra n 24, 233–34; Geimer, “Streitgenossenzuständigkeit”, supra n 128, 3090; 
Gottwald, supra n 128, 273; Wolf, supra n 24, 87.
145 The legal cognition is, however, unlimited if  Art 5(1) and 5(3) coincidently allocate jurisdiction to 
the same judicial district.
146 More precisely, the “scope of  the legal cognition” correlates with the demarcation of  “matters 
relating to contract/tort” and is thus to be interpreted autonomously. It may be said that the 
court can take into account all rules of  law governing causes of  action which are autonomously 
qualifi ed as “matters relating to contract/tort”.
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fori).147 As a matter of  European law, the Judgments Regulation limits these 
procedural principles as far as Article 5 is concerned and has, accordingly, an 
impact on national procedural law. Although it is perfectly possible that, under 
national law, the parties only have to declare the remedy sought and plead and 
prove the facts relied upon (but not the law), the Judgments Regulation prevents 
the court from considering legal bases which possibly provide for such a remedy 
but for which it does not have jurisdiction. In other words, even if  the parties 
“give the facts”, the judge is only entitled to “give part of  the law”.
C. CONCURRENT LIABILITY: MULTIPLE PROCEEDINGS
It is concluded that the contractual forum has only (but still) jurisdiction to 
adjudicate upon contractual claims and the delictual forum only (but still) to 
do so upon tortious claims. If  these causes of  action arise from the same facts 
and the claimant brings separate parallel proceedings,148 the question arises 
whether these involve the “same cause of  action” for purposes of  Article 27 
(to the effect that the court seised second has to stay or decline its proceedings) 
or, if  not, they fall under Article 28 (related actions).
1. Article 27 : Same Cause of  Action?
(a) Applying the Autonomous Interpretation of  the ECJ
The ECJ has defi ned the term “same cause of  action” in Article 27 as compris-
ing “the facts and the rule of  law relied on as the basis of  the action”149 and 
added the concept of  the “same object”, which is not expressly referred to in 
the English version, and defi ned it as “the end the action has in view”.150 Fol-
lowing that case law, it is rather evident that contractual and tortious claims, 
arising from the same facts, are based on different rules of  law:151,152 the forme r 
 is based on the “law of  contracts” (contractual basis), the latter on the “law of  
torts” (tortious basis). Consequently, separate proceedings for such claims must 
147 In some legal systems (as opposed to England) this principle is, to some extent, even extended 
to foreign law.
148 Either under Art 5(1) and 5(3) or under Art 2 (limited to either claim) and Art 5.
149 The Tatry, supra n 71, [38].
150 Gubisch, supra n 84, [14]; The Tatry, supra n 71, [37], [40].
151 “Rule of  law” does not refer to any particular provision but to a more functional or teleologi-
cal concept; F Dasser, “Art 27” in Oberhammer and Dasser, supra n 127, 574; Leible, supra n 
31, 649–50.
152 In Maersk, supra n 71, the ECJ considered an action for damages as a different cause of  action 
than an application for the establishment of  a liability limitation fund since, even if  the facts 
were the same, “the legal rule which forms the basis of  each of  those applications is different. 
… The [former] is based on the law governing non-contractual liability, whereas the [latter] is 
based on the 1957 Convention.”
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involve different causes of  action for the purposes of  Article 27.153 Further-
more , it seems reasonably clear that such proceedings cannot have the same 
end in view as they seek to establish different liabilities.154
Even if  the rule of  law was considered irrelevant, contractual and tortious 
claims may be said, strictly speaking, to be based on slightly “different facts”: 
although both might well arise from the very same incident, only the former 
requires pleading and proof  of  a contract concluded between the parties; this 
preceding “factual complex of  reaching an agreement” is by defi nition not pre-
supposed by the tort claim.
Consequently, although the ECJ has interpreted Article 27 “broadly”,155 it is 
diffi cult to see how one might consider contractual and tortious claims as the 
same cause of  action without substantially changing the corresponding defi ni-
tion under Article 27.
(b) Limited L egal Cognition: No Lis Pendens and No Res Judicata
It is submitted that Article 5(1) and 5(3) do not allow contractual and tortious 
claims to be brought together, both heads providing for a limited legal cogni-
tion of  the court.156 Firstly, if  the court seised second were obliged to decline 
jurisdiction as regards a claim which is not and cannot be heard and tried in 
the court seised fi rst, Article 27 would lead to a denial of  justice.157 Secondly, 
i t will be argued in Section D that a judgment on one claim does not have 
preclusive res judicata effects on the other claim; inter alia because that would 
infringe the right to be heard.158 Assuming that this is correct, it would be 
153 Bank of  Tokyo-Mitsubishi v Baskan Gida Sanayi Ve Pazarlama [2004] EWHC 945 (Ch), [2004] ILPr 
427 [210] (Lawrence Collins J; proceedings for declaration of  non-liability in contract held to 
involve a different cause of  action than proceedings for, inter alia, a tortious claim based on 
fraud); BGer 28.2.2006, 4C.351/2005 [4.4]; Hill and Chong, supra n 12, 277; Dasser, supra n 
151, 574–75; M Liatowitsch and A Meier, “Art 27” in AK Schnyder (ed), Lugano-Übereinkommen 
zum internationalen Zivilverfahrensrecht (Dike, 2011), 652–53; Leible, supra n 31, 649–50; contra: D 
Tsikrikas, “Einige Gedanken über die ‘autonome’ Bestimmung des Streit- und Urteilsgegen-
standes im europäischen Zivilprozessrecht”, in R Stürner et al (eds), Festschrift für Dieter Leipold 
zum 70 Geburtstag (Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 354–55; Roth, supra n 128, 359–71, erroneously trying 
to export a concept derived from (German) national procedural law according to which the 
relevant cause of  action is exclusively defi ned by reference to the set of  facts and the relief  
sought but not the rule of  law (thereby speculating that the ECJ “self-evidently” did not mean 
what it said in The Tatry, supra n 71); he also supports the view that the contractual forum has 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon tortious claims and vice versa (see supra n 128) thereby denying 
any limitation of  the court’s legal cognition; however, both suggestions are bound to fail since 
the corresponding argumentation is entirely based on (irrelevant) German procedural law.
154 See R Fentiman, “Art 27” in Magnus and Mankowski, supra n 15, 587–88, generally suggesting 
that a common object is both, necessary and suffi cient.
155 See, eg Maersk, supra n 71, [32]; nevertheless, the ECJ adopted in fact a rather narrow inter-
pretation in that case as well as in Gantner, supra n 70.
156 See supra, Section B.3(e). 
157 See AG Tesauro [1994] ECR I-5439 [17]–[18] on a similar situation.
158 See infra, Section D.4.
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pointless to oblige a court to decline jurisdiction if  it is clear from the outset 
that it will have to resume159 proceedings as soon as the fi rst court has rendered 
its judgment.160
(c) Contract  and Tort Claim: One Cause of  Action or Several?
So far, it has been implied that both the contractual and the tortious claim are 
to be qualifi ed separately, each being a “cause of  action” for the purposes of  
Article 27; this is self-evidently a prerequisite for considering them as “differ-
ent” causes of  action. However, there is no clarity as to the exact “object of  
qualifi cation” and the extent to which Article 27 applies.
In Kloeckner v Gatoil Overseas,161 a case concerning several invoices and con-
tracts of  sale, Hirst J held that Article 27 only applies as far as the same 
contracts and invoices are concerned: “every claim on each contract of  sale … 
is itself  technically a separate cause of  action, and these cannot … all be bun-
dled together into one composite cause of  action”. In Bank of  Tokyo-Mitsubishi162 
it was held that, although a contractual claim was barred by Article 27, a tor-
tious claim was not, implying that these are to be qualifi ed separately, each 
being a “separate cause of  action”. Lawrence Collins J nonetheless acknowl-
edged that “[t]o split the actions in this way is by no means satisfactory” but he 
felt that the decisions of  the ECJ dictate this result. Indeed, authority for such 
a “claim-by-claim approach” might probably be found in The Tatry163 where 
the ECJ established a corresponding “party-by-party approach”. Accordingly, 
the prevailing school of  thought counsels a view that Article 27 shall apply as 
far as there is identity between the causes of  actions underlying the actions in 
the two proceedings.164
In contrast, Andrew Smith J in Evialis v SIAT 165 and Beatson J in Underwrit-
ing Members of  Lloyd’s Syndicate v Sinco166 rejected look ing at “separate causes of  
action within the proceedings” but, instead, took the approach of  looking at the 
“proceedings as a whole” and “ask[ing] what is the central or essential issue”. 
Inter alia, they relied on the fact that “[A]rticles 27 and 28 refer to ‘actions’ 
and ‘proceedings’, and … do not contemplate parts of  actions or proceedings 
159 Art 27 (just as Art 28) applies only as long as the fi rst proceedings are “pending”: Berkeley Admin-
istration v McClelland (No1) [1995] ILPr 201 (CA) [26] (Dillon LJ); Dicey, supra n 63, 498; Cheshire, 
n 12, 304 [844].
160 See infra, Section D.3.
161 Kloeckner v Gatoil Overseas [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 177 (Comm) [206].
162 Supra n 153, [207]–[210], [244].
163 Supra n 71; adopted by AG Tesauro, supra n 157, [17]–[18].
164 Briggs and Rees, supra n 12, 316; Cheshire, supra n 12, 306; Leible, supra n 31, 653; Krop holler 
and von Hein, supra n 24, 492; Dasser, supra n 151, 575–76; Liatowitsch and Meier, supra n 153, 
662.
165 [2003] EWHC 863 (Comm), [2003] 2 CLC 802.
166 [2008] EWHC 1842 (Comm), [2008] 2 CLC 187.
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being stayed”.167 However, it mu st be noted that Article 27, in fact, also refers 
to “causes of  action”.
In both cases, the issue was whether “jurisdictional claims” in England (such 
as anti-suit injunctions or claims for breach of  jurisdiction clause) are barred 
by earlier foreign proceedings concerning the substantive claim if  the jurisdic-
tional issue is raised there. It is reasonably clear that such preliminary issues 
do not found separate causes of  action.168 However, that does not answer the 
present problem as the legal bases, upon which the remedy sought is based, are 
more than preliminary issues; rather, there are several main subject matters if  
it is based on several bases.
It is submitted that the “object of  qualifi cation” under Article 27 corre-
lates with the one in relation to jurisdiction under Article 5.169 Whenever two 
proceedings involve different facts and/or the remedies sought are based on 
different rules of  law and/or they pursue different objects, we are concerned 
with independent causes of  action capable of  being qualifi ed differently. It fol-
lows that Article 27 applies only (but at least) as far as the two proceedings are 
concerned with the same legal bases. If  the claimant has several shots on the 
target, success of  each leading to full satisfaction, each shot must be analysed 
separately as to whether the claimant is trying to shoot the same ball twice at 
different goals.
Likewise, if  the second proceedings are broader than the fi rst (involving 
more causes of  action), Article 27 will operate only (but at least) in relation to 
the causes of  action common to both proceedings.170
After all, this “claim-by-claim analysis” under Article 27 is a necessary con-
sequence of  splitting proceedings as envisaged in Kalfelis171 and its resulting 
limitation of  the legal cognition:172 if  proceedings under Article 5 (and/or a 
judgment) concerning one claim would bar the other, this would lead to a 
denial of  justice and an infringement of  the right to be heard.
2. Article 28: R elated Actions?
Having concluded that Article 27 does not apply173 in relation to contractual 
and tortious claims, the question remains whether Article 28 may apply, namely 
whether the claims are “related” within the meaning of  the legal defi nition of  
Article 28(3). The ECJ has interpreted this autonomous requirement broadly 
as covering “all cases where there is a risk of  confl icting decisions, even if  
167 Evialis, supra n 165, [127]; Lloyd’s Syndicate, supra n 166, [32], [63]; The Happy Fellow [1997] CLC 
1391 (CA) [1396].
168 The Happy Fellow, supra n 167, [1396]; see also Briggs and Rees, supra n 12, 317.
169 See supra, Section B.1(d)(iv).
170 AG Tesauro, supra n 157, [17]–[18]; Cheshire, supra n 12, 306.
171 Supra n 6.
172 See supra, Section B.3(e).
173 Art 28 is subsidiary; The Tatry, supra n 71, [49].
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the judgments can be separately enforced and their legal consequences are 
not mutually exclusive”.174 In Sarrio v Ku wait Investment Authority175 Lord Saville 
favoured a “broad commonsense approach” and a “simple wide test … refrain-
ing from an over-sophisticated analysis”.
It is still an open question whether the connection requirement in Article 
28(3) is to be interpreted in the same way as the one in Article 6(1).176 Although 
these apparently similar concepts are framed in identical words,177 there are 
tensions in their interpretations: Article 6(1) is (still) an exception to Article 
2 and to be interpreted narrowly,178 whereas Article 28 is to be interpreted 
broadly;179 however, the underlying purpose of  both provisions is the same, 
namely to avoid confl icting judgments.180 Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to 
treat authorities on Article 6(1) as, at least, persuasive for Article 28(3). Fur-
thermore, it appears that if  a connection is found under Article 6(1), the same 
must apply a fortiori for Article 28(3) since the latter is broader.
Concerning Article 6(1), the ECJ held obiter in Réunion Européenne that a con-
tractual and a tortious claim “cannot be regarded as connected”.181 However, 
paragraph 50 of  that decision was strongly criticised182 and Lloyd J doubted 
its correctness in Watson v First Choice Holidays.183 Finally, the ECJ essentially 
overruled184 that paragraph in Freeport v Arnoldsson185 and held that the fact that 
claims have “different legal bases does not preclude application of  [Article 
6(1)]”.
Following that line of  reasoning, it appears that contractual and tortious 
claims, arising from the same facts, might well be “related” also within the 
meaning of  Article 28(3).186 If  so, the second court may (on its own motion) 
174 The Tatry, supra n 71, [52]–[56], the term “irreconcilable” having a different meaning than in 
Art 34(3) as interpreted in Hoffmann v Krieg, Case 145/86 [1988] ECR 645.
175 Sarrio v Kuwait Investment Authority [1999] 1 AC 32 (HL) [41].
176 Left open in Roche Nederland v Primus, Case C-539/03 [2006] ECR I-6535; see Fentiman, supra 
n 154, 598–99.
177 Originally, Art 6(1) of  the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of  judgments in civil 
and commercial matters 1968 (Brussels Convention) did not contain a connection requirement. 
However, such was read into the text by the ECJ in Kalfelis, supra n 6, [8]–[13]; it thereby relied 
on Article 22 Brussels Convention and established a requirement in the same terms; this points 
towards a similar interpretation.
178 Kalfelis, supra n 6, [7]–[8].
179 The Tatry, supra n 71, [52].
180 Kalfelis, supra n 6, [11]; The Tatry, supra n 71, [51].
181 Supra n 124, [50].
182 Briggs and Rees, supra n 12, 294–95.
183 Supra n 126; reference to the ECJ was withdrawn after settlement.
184 It held that Réunion Européenne, supra n 124, was actually not concerned with Art 6(1) (since none 
of  the defendants was domiciled in the forum state) but with accessory jurisdiction under Art 
5(1) and 5(3), confusing these two issues which were considered independently in Kalfelis, supra 
n 6.
185 Supra n 125, [42]–[47].
186 Liatowitsch and Meier, supra n 153, 684; contra (but both decided prior to Freeport v Arnoldsson, 
supra n 125): Bank of  Tokyo-Mitsubishi, supra n 153, [241]; BGer 28.2.2006, 4C.351/2005 [5.3].
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stay its proceedings (Article 28(1)) or (on an application of  either party) decline 
jurisdiction and refer the case to the fi rst court for consolidation (Article 28(2)). 
Both options require that the action in the fi rst court is still “pending”;187 they 
are unavailable after defi ni te termination of  the fi rst proceedings. In addition 
to the requirement that a consolidation must be admissible under the lex fori of  
the fi rst court, Article 28(2) requires that that court has original188 jurisdiction 
over the second claim too. However, in a case where a contractual claim is pur-
sued under Article 5(1) and, subsequently, a related tortious claim under Article 
5(3), or vice versa, this latter jurisdiction requirement is usually189 not satisfi ed 
since there is no accessory jurisdiction under these provisions.190 This means 
that, in such a case, only Article 28(1) may apply and the second court may 
only “wait” for the result of  the fi rst court and potentially take into account its 
fi ndings. However, as soon as the fi rst proceedings are terminated, it is obliged 
to resume its own proceedings.
D. CONCURRENT LIABILITY: RES JUDICA TA ISSUES
It is concluded that parallel proceedings concerning concurrent liability may 
perfectly occur – one concerning a contractual claim (under Article 5(1)), the 
other concerning a tortious claim (under Article 5(3)). As long as both proceed-
ings are pending, Article 27 is not applicable as they concern different causes 
of  action; Article 28 can at most lead to a stay. However, as soon as either is 
terminated and a judgment has been given, Article 28 is inapplicable too;191 
any granted stay must be lifted. Instead, the judgment might have to be rec-
ognised under Chapter III in the still pending proceedings (Article 33); if  so, 
it has res judicata status and produces certain preclusive effects. The question 
arises whether and to what extent a Chapter III judgment on a contractual 
claim precludes related tortious claims (or vice versa). These rather complex 
and largely unsettled questions of  preclusion cannot be examined in full detail 
in this article; however, a brief  overview will be provided.192
187 See for the same requirement under Art 27: Supra n 159; Art 28(2) additionally requires that 
they are pending “at fi rst instance”.
188 Art 28 does not serve as a jurisdictional basis; see supra n 124.
189 Unless Art 5(1) and 5(3) coincidently allocate jurisdiction to the same judicial district.
190 See supra, Section B.3.
191 Arts 27 and 28 require “pending” proceedings; see supra n 159.
192 Generally: P Barnett, Res Judicata, Estoppel, and Foreign Judgments (Oxford University Press, 2001); 
G Spencer Bower and KR Handley, Res Judicata (LexisNexis, 4th edn, 2009).
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 1. English Law (Overview)
It is convenient to start with a look at English domestic law,193 under which, 
once a foreign judgment is recognised as having res judicata status, it produces 
cause of  action preclusion between the parties: on the one hand, it prevents the 
parties from contradicting the foreign determination of  the (non)existence of  a 
cause of  action (cause of  action estoppel); on the other hand, it prevents reas-
sertion of  and suing on the same (original) cause of  action for which recovery 
has, though less than hoped, already been granted (statutory former recovery 
plea194). In addition, issue preclusion prevents, in certain circumstances, either 
party from contradicting issues which have been decided by the foreign court 
as a necessary basis of  the judgment (issue estoppel). Alongside these classi-
cal res judicata pleas, the so-called Henderson plea, which is based on abuse of  
process,195 precludes matters which were not decided in the earlier proceedings 
but which, because properly belonging to that litigation, could and should have 
been raised and decided there. 196
In the present context, mainly cause of  action preclusion is of  interest; in 
particular, whether contractual and related tortious claims are considered as 
the “same causes of  action”,197 judgment on one precluding the other. In the 
absence of  clear authority, that question is unsettled; furthermore, there is no 
satisfactory defi nition of  the constituent parts of  a “cause of  action”. Some-
times it is defi ned by reference to the facts and (at least as regards torts) the right 
infringed; 198 this rather narrow defi nition might lead to the conclusion that con-
tractual and tortious claims are different ones. Sometimes, emphasis is rather 
on the factual situation only, namely on the act of  the defendant which gives the 
claimant his cause of  complaint and entitlement to a remedy; 199 this broader 
defi nition would probably embrace both claims. On the other hand, distinction 
193 Comprehensively: Barnett, supra n 192, chs 4–6.
194 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, s 34; enacted to reverse the illogical non-merger rule 
at common law for unsatisfi ed foreign judgments which allowed a claimant to sue alternatively 
on the judgment (ie recognition) or (again) on the original cause of  action (eg to obtain higher 
damages).
195 The exact basis of  this doctrine is still disputed; see Barnett, supra n 192, 191–95; KR Hand-
ley, “A Closer Look at Henderson v Henderson” (2002) 118 Law Quarterly Review 397; originally, 
Wigram V-C expressed it in terms of  res judicata, infra n 196.
196 Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100 (Ct of  Chancery) [114]–[116] (Wigram V-C); see gen-
erally Barnett, supra n 192, ch 6.
197 It is submitted that the answer is the same for both cause of  action estoppel and Civil Jurisdic-
tion and Judgments Act 1982, s 34; Barnett, supra n 192, 120.
198 Brunsden v Humphrey [1884] 14 QBD 141 (CA; Brett MR, Bowen LJ; Lord Coleridge CJ dissent-
ing); Barnett, supra n 192, 121–25; not followed by the CA in a similar case in Talbot v Berkshire 
County Council [1994] QB 290 where the Henderson rule was applied.
199 Republic of  India v India Steamship (The Indian Grace) (No 1) [1993] AC 410 (HL) [420]–[421] (Lord 
Goff); Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 (CA) [242]–[243] (Diplock LJ); Hill and Chong, supra n 
12, 423–424; A Samuels, “Suing Twice on the Same Accident” [1968] Modern Law Review 455.
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is drawn between alternative 200 and cumulative201 remedies or causes of  action, 
only the former leading to preclusion;202 this obviously leads to diffi cult choice-
of-law questions as to which law determines whether remedies are cumulative 
or alternative.
No clear answer can be given whether contractual and related tortious claims 
are the same203 or distinct204 causes of  action under English law. However, even 
if  we are concerned with “different causes of  action”, it is still arguable that 
at least the Henderson rule applies: if  only one claim was pursued in the foreign 
proceedings, an English court might strike out the other as an abuse of  process 
if  and because it could and should have been raised in the earlier litigation as 
properly belonging to it.205
2. Preclusive Effects of  a Regulation Judgment: Applicable Law
The preclusive effects attributed to judgments differ considerably from one 
legal system to another.206 Outside the Regulation, it is clear that the law of  
the recognising state (as the lex fori) determines which is the law determining 
the preclusive effects of  a recognised foreign judgment.207
Regarding a Regulation judgment, however, this question is not entirely set-
tled; two basic approaches would seem possible: according to the doctrine of  
equalisation of  effects, the preclusive laws of  the recognising state (as the lex 
fori 208) shall apply and the effects of  a corresponding domestic judgment would 
200 United Australia v Barclays Bank [1941] AC 1 (HL) [28]–[30] (Lord Atkin) held that in cases of  
alternative remedies, election is needed at the time of  judgment; thus, the claimant “can take 
judgment only for the one, and his cause of  action on both will then be merged in the one”; 
applied in Mahesan S/O Thambiah v Malaysia Government Offi cers’ Co-Operative Housing Society [1979] 
AC 374 (PC) [382]–[383] (Lord Diplock, concerned with two distinct, alternative remedies at 
common law).
201 Tang Man Sit, supra n 8, [521]–[523] (Lord Nicholls); having affi rmed United Australia, supra n 
200, on alternative remedies, he held that in cases of  cumulative remedies, the claimant is not 
required to choose and “may obtain judgment for both remedies and enforce both judgments” 
(limits being the Henderson rule and prevention of  double satisfaction).
202 Barnett, supra n 192, 119; Spencer Bower and Handley, supra n 192, 275–76, 284.
203 (Apparently) for preclusion: Spencer Bower and Handley, supra n 192, 95.
204 (Apparently) against preclusion: Barnett, supra n 192, 123 [186]; see also Briggs and Rees, supra 
n 12, 778.
205 See Talbot v Berkshire, supra n 198.
206 For example, issue preclusion is generally unknown outside the common law world. Never-
theless, even as regards cause of  action preclusion, the defi nition of  what are “same causes of  
action” may differ.
207 An English court, having recognised a foreign judgment outside the Regulation, will treat it as 
if  it were an English judgment (doctrine of  equalisation) and apply the English preclusive rules: 
The Indian Grace (No 1) [1994] ILPr 481 (CA) [36] (Leggatt LJ); reversed by the HL on other 
grounds, supra n 199; Barnett, supra n 192, 249, 251; Hill and Chong, supra n 12, 423.
208 From an English perspective, it could be argued that res judicata preclusion is a rule of  evidence 
and thus subject to the procedural law of  the forum.
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be accorded.209 In contrast, the doctrine of  extension of  effects obliges the 
recognising court to apply the preclusive laws of  the state of  origin, extend-
ing the original effects throughout the EU.210 Whereas the Regulation itself  is 
completely silent on that point, the Jenard Report favours the latter approach.211 
This appears to have been confi rmed by the ECJ in Hoffmann v Krieg:212 “[A] 
foreign judgment which has been recognized by virtue of  Article [33] must in 
principle have the same effects in the State in which enforcement is sought as 
it does in the State in which judgment was given”. However, in Apostolides v 
Orams 213 it qualifi ed that statement and appears to have adopted a combination 
of  the two approaches, namely that, although the law of  the state of  origin is 
still relevant in principle, there is “no reason for granting to a judgment, when 
it is enforced, … effects that a similar judgment given directly in the [enforc-
ing state] would not have”.
In contrast, Barnett214 and Briggs and Rees215 suggest that the answer differs 
in relation to each preclusive plea. The Schlosser Report appears to suggest that 
this is a question of  national law.216 
3 . Cause of  Action Preclusion: Relevance of  Article 27?
Under all approaches outlined above, national law217 would apply (whichever 
it may be), there being no uniform solution. However, a more modern school 
of  thought counsels relevance, to whatever extent, of  Article 27 on the ques-
tion whether the “same causes of  action” and the “same parties” are involved, 
209 See Barnett, supra n 192, 251; there does not seem to be much support of  this approach under 
the Regulation.
210 Dicey, supra n 63, 671–72; Cheshire, supra n 12, 604; P Stone, The Confl ict of  Laws (Longman, 
1995), 307; P Stone, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe (Longman, 1998), 152; D Lasok and 
P Stone, Confl ict of  Laws in the European Community (Professional Books Ltd, 1987), 289–90; this 
resembles the US full faith and credit clause, applying to sister states; see Barnett, supra n 192, 
259–64.
211 [1979] OJ C59/43.
212 Supra n 174, [11]; however, the ECJ was rather concerned with enforcement than preclusive 
effects; similarly, considering foreign law to determine the preclusive effects of  a foreign judg-
ment in England: The Tjaskemolen (No 2) [1997] CLC 521 (Admlty; Clarke J); Boss v Boss, supra 
n 75, [359] (Saville LJ).
213 Apostolides v Orams, Case C-420/07 [2009] ECR I-3571 [66]; again, the ECJ was concerned 
with enforcement.
214 Supra n 192, ch 7, basically applying the doctrine of  extension for cause of  action preclusion 
and the doctrine of  equalisation for issue and abuse of  process preclusion; see also Berke-
ley Administration (No 1), supra n 159, [77], where Hobhouse LJ tacitly applied English law as 
regards issue estoppel though apparently agreeing with Dillon LJ [26]–[28] who applied Art 
27 as regards cause of  action preclusion; see infra, Section D.3.
215 Supra n 12, 702–05.
216 [1979] OJ C59/127–128 [191]; P Kaye, Civil Jurisdiction and Enforcement of  Foreign Judgments (Pro-
fessional Books Ltd 1987), 1365–66 even suggests that it is beyond the scope of  the Regulation 
and beyond jurisdiction of  the ECJ to decide questions of  effects of  foreign judgments.
217 As far as English law would apply, the question whether contractual and related tortious causes 
of  action are the “same” is far from clear; see supra, Section D.1.
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not only for purposes of  lis pendens but also (at least) for cause of  action pre-
clusion.218 In De Wolf  v Cox219 the ECJ held that, after a judgment (in favour 
of  the claimant) has been given in one Member State, no proceedings may be 
brought in another on the same (original) cause of  action between the same 
parties. This establishes a mandatory, uniform former recovery plea, based on 
European law.220,221 As the ECJ particularly based its reasoning on Article 27,222 
one might infer that the requirements of  this plea (particularly what are “same 
causes of  action”) follow likewise from Article 27. In Drouot Assurances v CMI,223 
the ECJ was concerned with the requirement of  the “same parties” under Arti-
cle 27. It held that, in a case concerning formally different parties, there can 
still be “such a degree of  identity between the interests of  [the parties] that a 
judgment delivered against one of  them would have the force of  res judicata 
as against the other” and that therefore they “must be considered to be one 
and the same party for the purposes of  [Article 27]”. This can probably be 
understood as also meaning, the other way round, that if  the parties are con-
sidered the same under Article 27, they will both be bound by the effects of  
res judicata.224
The same approach was adopted by the Court of  Appeal in Berkeley Admin-
istration (No 1);225 Dillon LJ held that “where under Article [27] the proceedings 
are between the same parties and involve the same cause of  action and the 
218 Arguing that jurisprudence on Art 27 is somehow “persuasive authority”: Barnett, supra n 192, 
271 [101], 277; Fawcett et al, supra n 4, 620; KR Handley, “Res Judicata in the European 
Court” (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 191, 194; apparently favouring direct application of  Arti-
cle 27; Cheshire, supra n 12, 635.
219 De Wolf  v Cox, Case 42/76 [1976] ECR 1759 [10]–[12]; cited and confi rmed in Gubisch, supra 
n 84, [9].
220 Barnett, supra n 192, 279–80 [137]; Cheshire, supra n 12, 634–35; contra: Kaye, supra n 216, 1365–
66 who denies such a ratio as being beyond the jurisdiction of  the ECJ and claims exclusive 
application of  the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, s 34.
221 Such an autonomous European concept of  res judicata appears to be supported by the recent 
decision of  Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung v Samskip, Case C-456/11 [2012] ECR I-0000 [33]–[43] 
(concerning the Lugano Convention), where the ECJ held (i) that “procedural judgments” are 
covered by Article 32 and (ii) that a decision declining jurisdiction has binding effects, irrespec-
tive of  national law, as regards both, the operative part (declining jurisdiction) and the grounds 
(validity of  a jurisdiction clause for another Convention State); the ECJ based its reasoning on a 
“concept of  res judicata under European Union law”. Although this case is only concerned with 
the effects of  jurisdictional judgments (and paras [39]–[42] appear to imply that such judg-
ments are subject to a special res judicata regime), it is quite conceivable that the ECJ would 
nonetheless extend the Gothaer ratio to judgments on the merits. Allowing courts to review the 
latter (to the extent that the relevant national res judicata statute provides so) would still, just as 
regards the former (cf [35]–[38]), violate the principles of  no review as to the substance (Art 
36) and mutual trust; regardless of  whether the judgment is based on common rules of  EU 
(jurisdiction) law or on national (substantive) law.
222 De Wolf  v Cox, supra n 219, [10]–[12].
223 Drouot Assurances v CMI, Case C-351/96 [1998] ECR I-3075 [19].
224 Handley, “Res Judicata”, supra n 218, 194.
225 Supra n 159, [26]–[28]; citing Gubisch, supra n 84; this approach was accepted by Richard Scott 
V-C in Berkeley Administration v McClelland (No2) [1996] ILPr 772 (CA) [40]–[41].
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same subject matter, a judgment must … be binding under [Article 33] between 
all those parties”. This means that whenever – ex hypothesi – Article 27 would 
have applied, had the proceedings taken place at the same time (a judgment 
not yet being given), or did in fact apply (but were ignored226) , the earlier judg-
ment will have cause of  action preclusion and bar the proceedings coming to 
a judgment later.227 In Republic of  India v India Steamship (The Indian Grace) (No 
2),228 the House of  Lords even assumed (decisive) infl uence of  Article 27 (and 
particularly of  The Tatry229) on the interpretation of  what are “same parties” 
for purposes of  pure English domestic law (section 34 of  the Civil Jurisdiction 
and Judgments Act 1982). However, this way of  reasoning is probably histori-
cally incorrect.230
There are strong arguments that, if  not applying directly, account should 
at least be taken of  Article 27 and its corresponding jurisprudence in order to 
determine the scope of  cause of  action preclusion of  a Regulation judgment. 
Firstly, it would rarely be sensible to oblige a court to decline jurisdiction under 
Article 27 in favour of  other proceedings if  any resulting judgment would not 
bar the second proceedings. Certainly, there may be good reasons for the 
second court to stay proceedings and await the judgment of  the fi rst court, 
particularly in order to benefi t from issue estoppels. However, if  it is clear 
from the outset that proceedings will have to be resumed,231 Article 28 appears 
to be the appropriate instrument, being merely discretionary. Secondly, such a 
solution would enhance uniformity and legal certainty in international litiga-
tion and would, just as Article 27, help to avoid situations of  Article 34(3).232
4. Contractual and Tortious Claims: No Cause of  Action 
Preclusion
It has been concluded in Section C that contractual and related tortious claims 
are not the same causes of  action under Article 27. If  it is correct that Article 
27 predetermines cause of  action preclusion, it follows that a Chapter III judg-
ment on one claim does not preclude the other.233,234
226 The doctrine of  res judicata, if  interpreted in this way, is thus another device to avoid the situ-
ation of  Art 34(3) being some sort of  an “extended arm” of  Art 27.
227 Barnett, supra n 192, 277.
228 [1998] AC 878 (HL) [910] (Lord Steyn).
229 Supra n 71.
230 A Briggs, “Foreign Judgments and res judicata” [1997] British Year Book of  International Law 355–
56.
231 See supra n 159.
232 See supra n 226.
233 To that effect: Walter and Domej, supra n 126, 212.
234 However, issue estoppels may possibly arise – eg if  a contract was held to be invalid, an alleged 
tortfeasor might be estopped from relying on a contractual exemption clause in relation to the 
tort claim.
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Regarding the particular case considered here, there are other compelling 
arguments: it has been concluded that Article 5(1) and 5(3) do not allow bring-
ing contractual and tortious claims together, both provisions limiting the legal 
cognition of  the court.235 Assuming cause of  action preclusion for both claims 
would effectively lead to a substantive extinction of  one or the other claim.236 
 Although the claimant is still free to bring both claims together under Article 
2 and the defendant possibly to fi le a counter-claim (usually for negative dec-
laration) under Article 6(3)237 (both options preventing such an extinction), the 
framers certainly did not intend the bringing of  a claim under Article 5 to 
potentially amount to a waiver by the claimant of  another claim.
Furthermore, it would infringe the right to be heard (Article 6(1) ECHR238) 
since the original forum under Article 5 did not have jurisdiction to hear the 
other claim (limited legal cognition). It would deny justice239 if  the claimant 
was, in the original proceedings, excluded from pleading matters which the 
court was not entitled to hear, and, in subsequent proceedings, precluded by 
the judgment on the ground that the matter has been tried and heard and 
cannot be re-litigated. It is plain that the doctrine of  res judicata is inevitably 
linked to, and in fact based on, the right to be heard. It ensures that this 
right is granted no more than once; however, that right itself  demands that it 
is granted at least in one proper trial. Consequently, the preclusive effects may 
reach no further than the right to be heard was effectively granted. This is 
another reason why it is the Regulation (and the ECHR) which, by limiting 
jurisdiction and the corresponding legal cognition, requires limitation of  the 
preclusive effects as well.
It could be objected that both parties have somehow had, in fact, an oppor-
tunity to try the precluded claim in court: the claimant could have brought both 
claims under Article 2; the defendant could have instigated a counter-claim. 
One could be inclined to say that, since both parties have had the chance to be 
heard, they should be subjected to the preclusive effects of  res judicata in respect 
of  both claims. However, Article 5 certainly does not intend to force claimants 
to irrevocably waive claims not falling under the respective head; this would 
substantially lessen the attractiveness of  Article 5. Moreover, claimants would, 
when suing under Article 5, rarely be aware of  such a waiver. Be that as it 
may, extending preclusive effects to both claims would still infringe the right 
to be heard as it still precludes the claimant, in subsequent proceedings, from 
235 See supra, Section B.3(e).
236 Even if  the second claim can still be brought under Art 5 or (confi ned to that claim) under 
Art 2 (if  regarded as different causes of  action under Art 27), as soon as judgment on either 
claim was given, the other would be precluded and thus effectively extinguished.
237 Arguably, these claims arise from the “same facts”, being suffi ciently connected; see supra, Sec-
tion C.2 (concerning the connection-requirement in Art 28).
238 European Convention on Human Rights.
239 See for a similar situation (as regards Art 27): AG Tesauro, supra n 157, [17]–[18].
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pleading a claim on the ground that he could have pleaded it in a hypothetical 
earlier trial, although he could not in fact plead it throughout the actual trial.
It is concluded that, qua European law (and the ECHR), contractual and tor-
tious claims do not concern the same cause of  action, there being no cause 
of  action preclusion. Even if  there is room for the Henderson rule under the 
Regulation240 and even if  the related claim is considered to “properly belong 
to the litigation”, that rule can simply not apply if  the original court has taken 
jurisdiction under Article 5 since the claimant could not have raised the matter 
in that litigation for lack of  jurisdiction.241 In contrast, it may be argued that 
Henderson applies if  the claimant brings only one claim under Article 2.
5. Multiple Judgments: No Double Satisfaction
The result is that the claimant may well obtain two judgments, one on the 
contractual, the other on the tortious claim. Such judgments are not irrecon-
cilable (Article 34(3)) since they rule on different liabilities which may well exist 
in parallel. No problem arises if  one or both claims are dismissed. However, 
if  the claimant obtains two judgments which both award full damages, it is 
obvious that he cannot, in the aggregate, recover an amount in excess of  his 
loss. English law (as probably any civilised law) does not (based on equitable 
principles and probably as a matter of  public policy) tolerate double satisfac-
tion.242 Certainly, the Regulation does not intend to alter that; it is probably a 
matter of  national law how to deal with prevention of  double satisfaction at the 
enforcement stage. It is clear that a creditor, having obtained two judgments in 
his favour, “must give credit to the extent that either judgment is satisfi ed”:243 
payment on one satisfi es the other too.244 If  payment is made before the second 
judgment was given, this substantively extinguishes the second claim (and pre-
vents a second judgment in favour of  the claimant).245
240 Berkeley Administration (No 2), supra n 225, [25]–[36] (Scott V-C), [84]–[85] (Roch LJ); Barnett, 
supra n 192, 288–91.
241 See Barrow v Bankside Members Agency [1996] 1 WLR 257 (CA) [263] (Bingham MR); held that 
the Henderson rule does not apply if  the claim would not have been decided in the earlier pro-
ceedings anyway.
242 Tang Man Sit, supra n 8, [522]–[523] (Lord Nicholls); Kohnke v Karger [1951] 2 KB 670 (KB) 
[675]–[678] (Lynskey J); United Australia, supra n 200, [21] (V Simon LC); Barnett, supra n 192, 
91 [19], 119 [156]; Cheshire, supra n 12, 546; Briggs, “choice”, supra n 50, 14 [11]; Spencer 
Bower and Handley, supra n 192, 284; as far as a foreign judgment aims at granting damages 
twice, it might even be contrary to English public policy (Art 34(1)).
243 Barnett, supra n 192, 119 [156].
244 Enforcing the second is at least an abuse of  rights once full satisfaction has been obtained.
245 Tang Man Sit, supra n 8, [522]–[523] (Lord Nicholls).
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E. CONCLUSION
Applying the Regulation as currently in force and as interpreted by the ECJ, 
it is concluded that in cases where the claimant (allegedly) has, arising from 
one and the same incident, a contractual and a tortious cause of  action, both 
are to be qualifi ed separately for jurisdictional purposes. Although Article 5(1) 
and 5(3) are, indeed, mutually exclusive, that is so only in relation to each 
“single cause of  action” but not as regards the “entire dispute”. It follows that 
the mere existence of  a contract in the parties’ relationship does not as such 
exclude related tortious claims from Article 5(3); such may perfectly well fall 
within that provision if  the alleged liability does not presuppose any contract, 
the tortious duty existing independently. It has been argued that the claimant 
does not need to establish a good arguable case as to the existence of  a con-
tract/tort in order to obtain jurisdiction under Article 5(1) or 5(3);246 this largely 
allows him to choose the jurisdictional basis. However, if  the court fi nds that 
no contract/tort exists, it will only (but at least) render a binding judgment to 
that effect.
It has also been concluded that neither Article 5(1) nor 5(3) allow accessory 
jurisdiction for related claims; apart from Article 2, the contractual claim can 
only be brought under Article 5(1), the tortious claim only under Article 5(3). 
Accordingly, both provisions limit the legal cognition of  the court. As a nec-
essary consequence of  this splitting of  the dispute, parallel proceedings must 
be possible; contractual and tortious claims are not the same causes of  action 
under Article 27. However, they may be related under Article 28, allowing a 
discretionary stay.
As soon as judgment on one claim is given, the question arises whether it 
precludes the other claim. It has been argued that they are not the same causes 
of  action for res judicata purposes, there being no cause of  action preclusion. 
Arguably, this follows directly from European law, the Judgments Regulation pre-
determining cause of  action preclusion of  Regulation judgments. Certainly, if  
a creditor obtains two judgments in his favour, both awarding full compensa-
tion, he must give credit for both to the extent that either is satisfi ed; double 
satisfaction cannot be tolerated.
One might legitimately question whether the solution as elaborated in 
this article, which allows fragmentation of  proceedings and litigation of  con-
nected (or even identical) factual issues in more than one forum, is a sensible 
or desirable one in terms of  policy and practicality. Furthermore, the solution 
is admittedly of  considerable complexity. However, this is de lege lata – if  prop-
erly thought to an end – the result of  a jurisdictional system, as interpreted by 
the ECJ, which splits disputes by reference to different causes of  action (and 
246 However, in certain circumstances he may need to establish a “lively dispute”; probably accord-
ing to national law; see supra, Section B.2.
76 Contractual and Tortious Causes of  Action under the Judgments Regulation April 2013
their legal bases), at the same time denying jurisdiction based on relatedness. 
Although the latter and any “centralization of  jurisdiction” would certainly 
have practical advantages, it would require, de lege ferenda, a fundamental reform 
and, to a considerable extent, departure of  the idea of  actor sequitur forum rei 
being the cardinal jurisdictional principle.
